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Full State Funding of Education as a State
Constitutional Imperative
LAURIE REYNOLDS*
INTRODUCTION
With government spending on elementary and secondary education
surpassing the $536 billion mark annually,' it is no surprise that plaintiffs
around the country have found ample grounds for legal challenges to the
many funding decisions those huge numbers encompass. Because the
allocation of the revenues produces significant inequality in per capita
student spending between rich and poor school districts,' and because of
the well-known and shocking inadequacies in the educational experience
of many of our nation's children,3 the potential range of legal challenges
* Prentice H. Marshall Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.
I. These figures are for 2004 to 2005. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 1o FACTS ABOUT K-I2 EDUCATION
FUNDING I (2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/iofacts/iofacts.pdf.
2. The inequality has persisted since the beginning of modern school finance litigation, in which
plaintiffs documented the tremendous revenue gaps between rich and poor districts. See, e.g., San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 11-16 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258
(Cal. 1971). Since 2000, the Education Trust has issued annual reports documenting the ongoing, and
in some cases worsening, revenue inequality. For instance, it reported that in 2004, the gap between
wealthy and poor districts had increased in twenty-two states. KEVIN CAREY, EDUC. TRUST, THE
FUNDING GAP 2004: MANY STATES STILL SHORTCHANGE Low-INCOME AND MINORITY STUDENTS 8 (2004),
available at http://www2.edtrust.org/NRrdonlyres/3oB3CiB 3 -3 DA6-48o9 -AFB9-2DAACFIiCF88/o/
funding2oo4.pdf. More recently, it found that many states provide the least funding to schools teaching
students with the greatest educational needs. See CARMEN ARROYO, EDUC. TRUST, THE FUNDING GAP 4
(2OO8), available at http://www.closingtheachievementgap.org/cs/ctag/download/resources/75/Funding
Gap2oo7.pdf.x-r=pcfile-d ("In 2005, districts serving the highest concentration of poor students
received, on average, $938 less per-pupil in state and local money than the lowest poverty
districts .... As unjust as these amounts seem[,] they understate the real gaps in educational
opportunities. Students growing up in poverty do not merely need the same resources as others, they
need more from their schools than do students who can fall back on community and family resources
to support their achievement.").
3. For a recent account of continuing deficiencies in U.S. public schools, see Jeannie Oakes and
Martin Lipton. "Schools that Shock the Conscience": Williams v. California and the Struggle for
Education on Equal Terms Fifty Years After Brown, II ASIAN L.J. 234, 237-46 (2004), summarizing
the plaintiffs' evidence of deficiencies in the school, which the opposing party, the state, did not
dispute. See generally Jonathan Kozol, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (2004). For an eloquent defense of the need for radical reform of our public
education system, see W. Norton Grubb et al., The Unending Search for Equity: California Policy, the
"Improved School Finance," and the Williams Case, Io6 TCHRS. C. REC. 208i, 2097-98 (2004) ("The
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looms large. And in fact, plaintiffs in forty-five states have filed legal
challenges to their state's school funding formula. During the nearly four
decades of modern school finance litigation, lawsuits have loosely
coalesced around two doctrinal theories. The "equity" or "equality"
plaintiffs, typically described as those involved in cases filed before 1990,
relied on the equal protection clauses of the federal and state
constitutions. A number of state courts sided with the plaintiffs,' but the
legislative responses often did little to remedy the inequality.
6
Increasingly, plaintiffs turned to the adequacy doctrine, shifting the
argument away from inequality to assert that the state had not fulfilled
its constitutional duty to provide an adequate, thorough, or efficient
education.7
A comparison of the results in equality and adequacy states does not
establish the superiority of one approach over the other,8 and in fact it
would be a mistake to exaggerate the doctrinal differences between
them.9 Although most commentators and litigants continue to prefer
claims of equity are too deeply rooted in American history and education, and the consequences of
inequity-the miserable conditions in urban schools, the persistence of achievement and other gaps
including the black-white test score gap, the Latino-Anglo attainment gap, the differences in college
access, the persistent effects of family background on every imaginable educational outcome-are
unacceptable.").
4. See William Koski, Achieving "Adequacy" in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13,
13-14 (2007).
5. Of the twenty cases based on equality brought in state court, plaintiffs won in seven. James E.
Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 267 & nn.74-75 (1999).
6. See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1334, 1136-54 (2004) (examining equality remedies and concluding that "equalizing funding has not
equalized opportunity"). In fact, one commentator used the term "Pyrrhic" to describe the results of
equality litigation. Bradley W. Joondeph, The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of
Litigation-Prompted School Finance Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763,814 (1995).
7. William Thro was the first to use a wave metaphor to describe the shifting doctrinal bases of
school finance litigation from equality to adequacy. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the
Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597,
598 n.4 0994). Academic literature discussing the "waves" is vast. See, e.g., John Dayton & Anne
Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2359-76 (2004);
Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance
Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 571-79
(1998); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1151, 1151-56 (1995); Gail Levine, Meeting the Third Wave:
Legislative Approaches to Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 507-13
(i99I); Laurie Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 755,
762-67 (2004) [hereinafter Reynolds, Skybox Schools]; William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact
of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform
Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 219-50 (1990).
8. Laurie Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in School
Finance Reform, 40 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1835, 1851-62 (2007) [hereinafter Reynolds, Uniformity].
9. Both the equality and adequacy cases borrow heavily from each others' doctrinal
underpinnings and normative rationales, and the litigants cannot be so neatly cubbyholed as the
typology suggests. See generally Richard Briffault, Adding Equity to Adequacy, in SCHOOL MONEY
TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 25, 25-54 (Martin R. West & Paul E.
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adequacy,'" recent scholarship advocates new doctrinal norms, among
them a standard of vertical equity," meaningful educational
opportunity," and comparability.'3 Whatever the term of choice, the
claim is that school funds should be allocated according to the needs of
children rather than according to the wealth of their school district.
Notwithstanding the many strengths of the proposals for new legal
standards, my sense is that the doctrinal basis of the litigation is not the
major impediment to meaningful progress in school funding reform.
Rather, I attribute the disappointing history more to the inevitable long
term effect of the preservation of the local property tax as a source of
education funds. In any revised legislative scheme, whether designed to
Peterson eds., 2007). Inadequacy and inequality come together in the U.S. public school system. For
example, in Lakeview District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2oo2), the court noted the
"considerable overlap between the issue of whether a school funding system is inadequate and
whether it is inequitable." Id. at 496. Judicial decrees invalidating school funding systems frequently
combine notions of equality and adequacy notwithstanding the plaintiffs' singular doctrinal focus. For
instance, in Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), a landmark New Jersey decision heralded as
one of the earliest adequacy cases, the court interpreted the state's constitutional requirement of a
"thorough and efficient" education as requiring "equal educational opportunity" for New Jersey
students. Id. at 283; accord Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 152-56 (Tenn. i993);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v.
State (Campbell 1), 907 P.2d 1238, 1263-8o (Wyo. 1995). Professor James Ryan's recent analysis of the
cases came to the same conclusion. James P. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation,
86 TEX. L. REV. 1223, 1232-39 (2008).
io. See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48
VAND. L. REV. ios, 166-83 0995); Heise, supra note 7, at 1162-76; Molly McUsic, The Law's Role in
the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND
SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 90-92 (Jay P. Huebert ed.,
1999); Molly McUsic, The Uses of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 307, 322-32 (i99i); Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate Educational
Opportunity, 14 J.L. & POL. 483, 495-501 (1998).
it. Vertical equity urges distribution of education revenues solely on the basis of children's
educational needs. It recognizes that some children are more expensive to educate than others, and
that a comparison of dollars spent is not likely to be a reliable way to assess educational opportunity.
In a case filed in 2000, for instance, plaintiffs in California asked the court to shift its focus from
inadequacy or inequality of revenues to a standard of adequacy of "real resources-credentialed
teachers, adequate textbooks, and appropriate physical facilities." Grubb et al., supra note 3, at 2094.
In 2004, the parties settled, with the state agreeing to provide money for books, safety in schools, and
more highly qualified teachers. The Williams Case-An Explanation, http://www.cde.ca.gov/eo/
ce/wc/wmslawsuit.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2009); see also Preston C. Green & Bruce D. Baker,
Circumventing Rodriguez: Can Plaintiffs Use the Equal Protection Clause to Challenge School Finance
Disparities Caused by Inequitable State Distribution Policies?, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 142 (2002)
(discussing the potential success of equal protection challenges that might come about as a result of
integrating vertical equity); Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 493, 516-i9 (1995). In an earlier article, I supported this development, arguing that
vertical equity more accurately tracks the right at stake in school finance and that it is more faithful to
the foundational principles of equal educational opportunity. See Reynolds, Uniformity, supra note 8,
at 1851-62.
12. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role
of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2007).
13. See Ryan, supra note 9, at 1225.
March 2009]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
produce equality, adequacy, or something else, the failure to eliminate
the local property tax means that wealthy districts have powerful
incentives to keep state funding at a lower level than they otherwise
would, in order to preserve as much local taxing capacity as possible for
themselves. It also means that over time, the system will drift back to the
same funding allocation and disparity, 14 thus suggesting that the
reemergence of the unconstitutional inequality or inadequacy is likely.
For those with an interest in school finance reform, merely keeping
up with the progress of ongoing litigation presents a challenge.
Identification of the states where lawsuits are filed, the status of the
litigation, the most recent iteration of court decisions in the dispute, and
the ultimate tally of whether a judicial opinion belongs in the plaintiffs'
win or loss column, are just some of the statistics that are constantly in
need of updating. 5 In terms of the results of those many lawsuits, Molly
Hunter, director of the Education Law Center, observed as recently as
2005 that "the [school funding] plaintiffs have won most of the recent
decisions.' 6 My growing doubts about the continued validity of this
assertion, as well as a sense that the plaintiffs' victories in litigation
usually deliver far less than the proponents expect, prompted this
decision to spill more ink in the debate over the future trajectory of
school funding reform.
In Part I, this Article surveys two current trends in school finance
reform, both of which cast doubt on the continued viability of lawsuits
that challenge the constitutionality of state school funding statutes. The
first of these trends is that plaintiff victories rarely produce a systematic
overhaul of the school funding formulas. In part, that may be because
legislators have not always rushed to implement their court-imposed
duty." But even in those states where legislative reform appears
14. Jeffrey Metzler's statistical analysis made this point most convincingly. See Jeffrey Metzler,
Inequitable Equilibrium: School Finance in the United States, 36 IND. L. REV. 561, 578-79 (2003)
("Surprisingly, almost no characteristic of a state's school finance program... was significantly
correlated with outcome measures. In other words, the allocation of resources in states with flat grant
or foundation programs were not, on average, any more equitable or wealth neutral than the
allocation of resources in states with percent equalizing, guaranteed tax base, or full state funding."
(footnote omitted)).
15. For a recent listing of plaintiff wins and losses, see Nina L. Pickering, Note, Local Control vs.
Poor Patrol: Can Discriminatory Police Protection Be Remedied Through the Education Finance
Litigation Model?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 741, 754 n.72 (20o6). The National Access Network tracks the
status of school funding litigation around the country and is an excellent resource. See Access Quality
Education: School Funding Litigation, Policy and Advocacy, http:llwww.schoolfunding.info/
index.php3 (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
16. Molly Hunter, Requiring States to Offer a Quality Education to All Students, 32 FALL HUM.
RTS. 1O, 1O (2005). Similar observations appear in the press accounts. See, e.g., Steve Smith & Greta
Durr, Litigation in Education, STATE LEGISLATURES, Sept. 2004, at 12, 14 ("[P]laintiffs have been
successful in approximately two-thirds of the major education finance cases since 1989. Over the past
few years, they've won an even higher percentage of court cases.").
17. Arkansas is a good example of the problem. The Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in
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significant, the long term results have also been disappointing. In the all
too frequent sequence of events, new generations of lawsuits are filed
within years of the original court decree, and the plaintiffs discover that
they are challenging funding allocations that are similar to or worse than
the ones that prompted the original lawsuit.'8 A second trend is suggested
by a spate of recent judicial opinions revealing weariness with continued
judicial involvement in these seemingly intractable disputes. Over the
last six years, courts in a number of states have used a variety of related
legal doctrines to declare that school funding claims are beyond the
scope of the judicial power. 9
The analysis offered here posits that the two trends are closely
related, and that both stem, at least in part, from the failure of school
finance plaintiffs to seek narrowly targeted judicial declarations that
identify the fatal flaw of most state school funding laws. In Part II, I
explain how state constitutional guarantees of uniformity of taxation may
provide a solution. I argue that this textual limit on state taxation powers,
which is found in every state constitution, can be the catalyst for an
overhaul of the funding formulas. When seen through the prism of well-
established tenets of state and local government law, the uniformity
doctrine should invalidate the use of the local property tax for funding
public schools, meaning that the only constitutionally permissible means
of funding public education is a system that is fully funded at the state
level."0
Dupree v. Alma School District No. 3o, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983), invalidated the state's school
finance statute and condemned its failure to provide equal educational opportunity. Id. at 94. More
than twenty years later, the court once again invalidated the state's school funding system,
condemning the "glacier speed" of the legislative response. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee,
210 S.W. 3 d 28, 30 (Ark. 2005) (discussing the court's mandate to the legislature to fix school finance
system in splintered opinions).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 21-61.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. Proposals for full state funding of education have been in the literature for decades. See, e.g.,
Arthur Wise, Movement Toward Full State Funding: A Proposal, i I THEORY INTO PRAC. 13, 131-36
(1972). In fact, the New Jersey Federation of Labor made the same proposal as early as 1947. See
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973) ("It has been noted that the 1947 Constitutional
Convention did not act upon a recommendation of the New Jersey Federation of Labor that education
be funded out of State revenues."). One of the earliest and most influential defenses of wealth
neutrality in public education in the modern school finance literature is JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PUBLIc EDUCATION (1970). In that volume, the authors argued that "the quality of public
education may not be a function of wealth other than the total wealth of the state." Id. at 304. The
supreme courts of California and more recently Wyoming explicitly accepted that standard as the basis
for their invalidation of the state's school funding statute. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal.
1971) ("Recognizing as we must that the right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental
interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose
necessitating the present method of financing[,]" which "makes the quality of a child's education a
function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors."); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. i v. Herschler,
6o6 P.2d 310, 336 (Wyo. 198o).
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In Part III, I identify five states that have embraced a full state
funding approach to school finance. I compare their trajectories and note
the stark differences between those full state funding states that
remained rooted in basic equality concepts and those that have relied on
adequacy as their doctrinal foundation. I argue that the promise of full
state funding is severely undercut by the adequacy rationale and
conclude that the states' experiences confirm the sustainability and
superiority of equality. Though even a radical change in funding sources
will not produce a miracle cure to our public education system's serious
shortcomings, I argue that full state funding has the potential to refocus
the school finance debate in important ways, and that it allows courts to
insist on a constitutional school funding formula without entering the
difficult, and some would say, essentially legislative, policy debate over
what a public education should provide and how best to implement the
state's aspirations for the education of its children.
I. DISAPOINTING TRENDS IN SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
A. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES PROVIDE TEMPORARY RELIEF
Of the various state legislative responses to judicial invalidation of
states' school funding statutes, two predominate: a targeted infusion of
revenue for the poorest districts; and an increase in the state's
proportional share of total school revenues." Unfortunately, neither of
these approaches, whether used separately or in combination, has
produced a funding system that eliminates the flaws found crucial in the
relevant supreme court decree of invalidation. Thus, it should come as no
surprise that unconstitutional features routinely reemerge and prompt a
subsequent generation of litigation.
i. Targeted Allocation of New Revenue
By far the most frequent legislative response to judicial invalidation
of a state's school funding statute, irrespective of the doctrinal basis of
the holding, is appropriation of large sums of money for the state's
poorest and/or most underperforming schools. According to one survey,
states have spent more than $34 billion to comply with judicial orders in
school funding litigation.2 Legislative infusion of funds temporarily
21. A third and much less frequent type of response has been the legislative imposition of caps on
the local tax rate or on total local revenues for school funding. Usually done in conjunction with the
appropriation of additional state funds for the poorest districts, the caps are intended to close the gap
between poorest and richest districts. In an earlier article, I concluded that the caps did little to
enhance equality, primarily because they contain so many grandfathering provisions, exemptions, and
opportunities for local option supplementation that they invariably preserve, and sometimes
exacerbate, the disparities that led to their imposition. See Reynolds, Skybox Schools, supra note 7, at
779-804.
22. See CHIS ATKINS, TAX FOUND., BACKGROUND PAPER No. 55, APPROPRIATION BY LMGATION:
ESTIMATING THE COST OF JUDICIAL MANDATES FOR STATE AND LOCAL EDUCATION SPENDING 7 (2O07),
[Vol. 60:749
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eliminates the crisis, provides greater equalization between rich and poor
districts, and ends the lawsuit. However, as states experience economic
downturns or as a new spending crisis captures the public's attention,
state dollars for education stagnate. What happens next is also
predictable-wealthy districts resort to their local powers of property
taxation to make up the state's shortfall, the gap between wealthy and
poor districts returns to its previous magnitude, and the inadequacy of
the poorest districts again reaches unconstitutional levels.
The Washington legislature responded to its supreme court's 1978
invalidation of the state school finance law 3 by adopting the seemingly
equalizing reforms of a statewide property tax, enhanced state funding,
and caps on local school property taxation powers.24 Within years,
however, the inequality between wealthy and poor districts was worse
than before the litigation. 5 Since 2006, in fact, two separate lawsuits have
been filed in Washington, both arguing that the school funding statute
continues to violate the state constitution and ignores the supreme
court's holding that education must be funded by state, and not local,
funds. 6
The experience of Kansas follows along the same lines. In Mock v.
State, the court invalidated Kansas' property-tax based school funding
scheme. 7 In response, the state legislature passed the School District
Finance and Quality Performance Act,9 which the Kansas Supreme
Court upheld as constitutional. 9 Less than ten years later, another
challenge was filed, based in part on evidence that the disparity between
rich and poor school districts had climbed back to its pre-Mock levels,
reaching a gap of 300% between the top and bottom.3° The legislative
decision to preserve optional local levies, which could generate up to
available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/bp55.pdf.
23. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 97-98 (Wash. 1978).
24. For details of the school finance system adopted in response to the supreme court's decision,
see Reynolds, Skybox Schools, supra note 7, at 785-88.
25. In 198o, two years after the Washington Supreme Court's holding in Seattle School District
No. i, local levies were 8% of district budgets. Op-Ed., In Our View: Levy Lid Heavy, COLUMBIAN
(Vancouver, Wash.), Mar. 15, 2003, at C6. In some districts they now account for almost 30%. Id.
26. Petition for Declaratory Judgment 9-i9, McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Jan. is, 2oo7), available at http://www.waschoolexcellence.org/files/SEADOCS%
2050757362%2oPetition%2ofor%2oDeclaratory%2OJudgment%20-%2oHigh%2oResolution%20I.PDF:
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 4.1-34, Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 V. State, No. o6-2-86840-I
(Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2oo6), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/wa/FederalWay-
complaint%2o1i1-20-o6.pdf. Both lawsuits point to the state's failure to implement a fully state funded
system of education as the crucial constitutional flaw. Petition for Declaratory Judgment, supra, 99-
lO8; Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra, 5.1-4.
27. No. 9I-CV-Ioo9 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Oct. 14, i99i); see also Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-17 3 8, 2003
WL 22902963 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (describing and quoting Mock v. State extensively).
28. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-6405 to -644o (2002).
29. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1197 (Kan. 1994).
30. Montoy, 2003 WL 22902963, at *37.
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25% of a district's total budget,3' was the primary culprit, and not
surprisingly, more litigation ensued.32
Wyoming's experience is also illustrative. In Washakie County
School District No. i v. Herschler,33 the state's highest court invalidated a
school finance system because of the district inequality resulting from its
reliance on the local property tax. In spite of post-Washakie legislative
reforms, ten years later the gap between rich and poor districts had
grown by a factor of more than six."
Undoubtedly, one of the most spectacular recent infusions of state
money for public education is the New Jersey legislature's appropriation
of $500 million for the state's poorest urban districts.35 As an apparent, or
at least temporary, end to the state's long running lawsuit in Abbott v.
Burke (Abbott ),,6 which produced no fewer than seventeen state
supreme court decisions,37 the appropriation went directly to the plaintiff
school districts in that case. Because the New Jersey Supreme Court had
no realistic estimate of what the constitutionally required "thorough and
efficient ',, 8 education would cost in the plaintiff districts (referred to as
"special needs districts" or "Abbott districts"), it ordered that they were
entitled to per capita revenues equal to those of the state's wealthiest
districts.39 Moreover, because the plaintiff districts had documented their
inability to raise local taxes to fund their schools, the supreme court
ruled that their "municipal overburden" exempted them from the
responsibility of contributing additional local revenues to their public
31. Montoy v. State, No. 99 -C-17 3 8, 2004 WL 1094555, at *4 (Kan. Dist. Ct. May 11, 2004).
32. For a history of the litigation in Montoy v. State, which involved five more supreme court
opinions and numerous lower court orders, see Montoy v. State, 138 P.3 d 755, 757-59 (Kan. 2006).
33. 606 P.2d 310,322 (Wyo. I98O).
34. See Campbell 1, 907 P.2d 1238, 1250 (Wyo. 1995).
35. See BRENDA LIsS ET AL., DON'T FORGET THE SCHOOLS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR TAX REFORM
9 (2oo6), available at http://ielp.rutgers.edu/docs/DFTS2-web.pdf.
36. 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985).
37. Liss ET AL., supra note 35, at 6.
38. The New Jersey Constitution provides that "[tihe Legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction
of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
39. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 11), 575 A.2d 359, 385-86 (N.J. 199o). The New Jersey
Department of Education classifies districts according to their socioeconomic status. NJ Department
of Education District Factor Groups (DFG) for School Districts, http://www.state.nj.us/education/
finance/sf/dfgdesc.shtml (last visited Mar, 23, 2009). The Abbott plaintiffs are comprised of New
Jersey's poorest urban districts, all classified as either A or B. See Liss Er AL., supra note 35, at 5. The
court ordered that the legislature assure that funding in the those districts be roughly equal to
spending in the state's wealthiest I and J districts. Abbott 11, 575 A.2d at 408. In Abbott by Abbott v.
Burke (Abbott IV), the court rejected the legislature's statutory revisions and reinstated the Abbott II
funding mandate. 693 A.2d 417, 444 (N.J. 1997). The court found that the I and J district budgets were
an "objective and reasonable" measure of necessary resources for the special needs districts, but it
encouraged the state to come up with its own standards to determine the cost of providing a thorough
and efficient education. Id. at 440-42.
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schools.4" The legislature responded with an appropriation that purported
to identify the cost of a constitutional education, at a level well below the
court-ordered amount. That move led to another judicial invalidation,
with the court expressing its disapproval of the legislature's failure to
provide a "measuring stick against which to gauge the resources needed
to provide that educational opportunity."4' As a result, in the absence of
an acceptable computation of the real cost of providing a constitutional
education to the Abbott districts, spending levels for New Jersey's most
desperate districts are not determined by the state legislature, but
indirectly by the wealthy districts, whose budgets are matched by the
state for the Abbott districts. In the words of one commentator, New
Jersey has "no funding 'system' in place at all, let alone one that is
thorough and efficient.
42
Notwithstanding the unusual method of its computation, the
enormity of the legislative response43 to Abbott suggests that the
reemergence of the gap between Abbott districts and the wealthy districts
will be substantially delayed. But the New Jersey funding scheme is
unlikely to create a stable funding system over the long term, and not
only because of its huge price tag. By singling out a group of New
Jersey's worst performing and poorest school districts, it creates a new
group of districts at the bottom. In fact, seventeen poor rural districts are
currently involved in litigation that raises many of the same allegations
about underfunding and municipal overburden as their Abbott
predecessors.' Similarly, the now forgotten "middle income districts"
find themselves squeezed by the general tax hikes necessary to pay for
Abbott funding and disadvantaged by the anti-equalizing tendencies of
state law.45 Thus, victory for the Abbott districts has created a new set of
40. Abbott 11, 575 A.2d at 393-94.
41. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 432.
42. Liss ET AL., supra note 35, at io.
43. In terms of overall state education funding, in fact, the state is currently spending more than
half of its annual school budget on Abbott districts. See Catherine Gewertz, A Level Playing Field,
EDuc. WK., Jan. 6, 2005, at 5. Those districts educate only 22% of the state's children. Id.
44. See PAUL TRACTENBERG, DON'T FORGET THE SCHOOLS: FISCAL, BUDGET AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR TAX REFORM 9 (2oo6), available at http://ielp.rutgers.edu/docs/DFTSi-web.pdf. In
an administrative proceeding before the State Board of Education, Bacon v. Department of Education,
seventeen poor A and B districts from rural areas, which had not been included as Abbott districts,
filed a claim that they were entitled to the same state aid as the Abbott districts. 942 A.2d 827, 831
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). Since the original administrative law judge decision in 2002, one new
district has been designated as "special needs" and thus entitled to Abbott funding. Id. at 833. The
State Board ordered an examination of the current funding system in order to establish a unified
system of funding. Id. at 835. The New Jersey appellate court recently ordered the Commissioner of
the Department of Education to proceed with that order and to undertake a needs assessment for the
poor rural districts who had sought Abbott status. Id. at 838.
45. In Stubaus v. Whitman, the court denied standing to the plaintiff districts and rejected the
individual plaintiff's claims that New Jersey's funding statute was unconstitutional because it increases,
rather than decreases, funding disparities. 770 A.2d 1222, 1230, 1237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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losers, with their own legal challenges to the ways in which the legislative
response to Abbott has adversely affected them. So long as the New
Jersey legislature responds to lawsuits with a piecemeal appropriation to
the year's most recent plaintiffs and with legislation that leaves the local
property tax system at the heart of the scheme, it will never comply with
the supreme court's admonition that additional funding alone will not
solve the problem and that only "comprehensive and systemic relief will
bring about enduring reform." '
Although legislative infusion of money at the bottom may provide
only temporary relief, the plaintiff recipients of these much needed
revenues understandably would be slow to criticize the legislative
response. From their perspective, the new funds put them in a markedly
superior position to their prelitigation status, whatever the sustainability
of the resulting legislation. A recent study, however, casts doubt on even
that limited positive gloss and concludes that long term spending patterns
for education in states with plaintiff victories are actually lower than
would have been predicted in the absence of litigation. 7 That study also
found that although the spending levels for education are not sustained
long term, the higher rate of taxation that was originally necessary to
generate those funding increases does not decrease when education
funding stagnates, thus leaving state citizens with a higher tax burden
while diverting some of the revenues away from education4a8
Victorious school finance plaintiffs undoubtedly have reasons to
celebrate legislative spending increases as a result of their litigation, yet
the evidence suggests that the gains are not likely to remain in place for
the long term. Though it may be a bit of a cynical stretch to assert that
today's victories are tomorrow's lawsuits, the plaintiffs' ascendancy into
the winner's column inevitably starts the ball rolling-one that will
produce the losers who will file the next lawsuit.49 The longer view of the
results of school funding litigation give ample reason to doubt the
efficacy of legislative reforms that pour money into the poor or
disadvantaged districts without overhauling the tax system that produced
the crisis.
2. Increasing the State's Proportional Share of Education Spending
Because some of the largest gaps between rich and poor school
districts occur in states with the lowest percentage of state funding,"0 most
46. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 445.
47. See ATKINs, supra note 22.
48. See id. at 3.
49. A concurring judge in the recently terminated litigation over school funding for New York
City, made a similar observation, noting that other districts are likely to have equally meritorious
claims and that a statewide approach to funding issues is required. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v.
State, 8oi N.E.2d 326, 36o-61 (N.Y. 2003) (Smith, J., concurring).
50. Illinois is a good example, where the gap between the richest and poorest school districts' per
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state funding reform involves, to a greater or lesser degree, an increase in
the percentage of the state's share of the total education budget. Again,
though, the results are disappointing. Increasing the state's share often
means that total spending on education decreases.5 Most frequently, this
is because when the state assumes responsibility for a greater share of
school revenues, that budget item must compete with other state
priorities in the state budget process. Without a separate, pledged and
untouchable stream of revenue, the give and take of the legislative
process" means that education is unlikely to enjoy the same budget
priority that may be prevalent when local property is taxed to fund local
schools.
Moreover, as dramatic evidence from the State of Michigan shows, a
major shift from local to state sources of school funding, in and of itself,
does nothing to make the funding allocations less dependent on the
wealth of the local school districts. In 1993, the Michigan legislature
eliminated local school property taxes, causing an immediate $7 billion
shortfall in existing revenues. 3 The following year, voters had a choice of
two alternative funding methods devised by the legislature. Proposal A,
which increased the sales tax, adopted a cigarette tax and imposed a state
education property tax, was chosen in a statewide election.54 All pre-
Proposal A budgets that exceeded the new state funding level were
protected from reduction by a "hold harmless" provision, which means
that the inequality that used to stem from property wealth disparities
between local school districts is now enshrined as part of the state's
pupil spending is nearly $30,000. See CHRISTOPHER M. MULLIN & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN BROWN, ILL.
EDUC. RESEARCH COUNCIL, GROUNDING RESEARCH IN REALITY: FISCAL EQUITY AND K-i2 FUNDING IN
ILLINOIS 16 (2oo8), available at http://ierc.siue.edu/documents/2oo8-3% 2oGrounding%2oResearch
%2oin%2oReality.pdf. The State of Illinois contributes less than 30% of all school dollars, leaving the
rest to be generated from the local property tax. See Diane Rado, Rich School, Poor School, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 4, 2007, available at http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2oo7/feb/o4/news/chi-0702040055
feb04; Diane Rado & Darnell Little, Spending Gap Grows for Schools, CHI. TRoB., Aug. s, 2005,
available at http:/lwww.redorbit.com/news/education/193782/spending-gap-grows-for-schools/.
51. In fact, one statistical analysis of state spending patterns found a negative correlation between
a state's average expenditure per pupil and the percentage of education funds that come from the
state. Metzler, supra note 14, at 58o. Metzler found that "[liower state contributions as percentage of
total spending correlate with higher average spending at a statistically significant level." Id.; see also
McUsic, supra note 6, at 135o n.8 7 (noting that a shift towards state rather than local funding also
results in a shift of resources away from education and toward other budget priorities).
52. This phenomenon is known to urban economists as full line forcing. Studies of budgeting for
services in urban areas have established that when a funding source is isolated and pledged specifically
to a particular service, overall revenues are higher than when that service must compete with others
for a share of the general revenues fund. See generally KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE GOVERNMENT 189-217 (997).
53. See School Finance in Michigan Before and After the Implementation of Proposal A, in THE
MICHIGAN SCHOOL AID ACT COMPILED AND APPENDICES app. A (1994), available at
http:llwww.senate.michigan.govlsfafPublications/JointReplfinpropa95comp.html (detailing Proposal
A and how it changed school funding).
54. Id.
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distribution formula." This "range-preserving '' 56 feature of enhanced
state funding means that many wealthy districts now receive more state
revenues than poor ones.57 In essence, the Michigan plan provided
property tax relief while preserving the high spending levels that the
property had tax provided to wealthy districts.5 Though the state of
Michigan's share of overall school funding increased from 26.6% to
67.3 % between 1992 and 1995, 5" the gaps and inequality have remained.6
In sum, the most frequent legislative responses to judicial
invalidation provide no cause for celebration. Although the immediate
beneficiaries of the increase in state largesse may initially interpret the
legislative response as evidence of the state's commitment to improve
educational quality for all children, the inevitable trend is toward the
reestablishment of the funding conditions that triggered the lawsuit. 6,
What these two common legislative responses have in common is that
they leave the local property tax in place as a source of school funding or
institutionalize its impact in a state distribution formula. This guarantees
that the funds available for educational opportunity in the state will
continue to depend on the property wealth located within the school
districts' borders, and that an unconstitutional funding allocation is never
far from the surface.
55. Id.
56. See Michael F. Addonizio et al., Blowing Up the System: Some Fiscal and Legal Perspectives
on Michigan's School Finance Reform, 107 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 20 (1996).
57. Bloomfield Hills, one of the five richest municipalities in the United States, receives an
additional $5,176 per pupil from the state whereas the Detroit public schools' additional payment is set
at $353. Citizens for Equity, http://www.citizensforequity.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (follow the
"(full listing here)" hyperlink under "Is this Equity?") (school funding watchdog group providing
information on the gaps in per pupil spending). Over 400 districts receive no supplemental funding. Id.
58, This glaring inequality in distribution of state money suggests equal protection challenges
under the state constitution. See Addonizio et al., supra note 56, at 35.
59, Michele Moser & Ross Rubenstein, The Equality of Public School District Funding in the
United States: A National Status Report, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 63, 68--69 (2002).
60. See DAVID ARSEN ET AL., ADEQUACY, EQUITY AND CAPITAL SPENDING IN MICHIGAN SCHOOLS 1-3
(2005), available at http://www.epc.msu.edu/publications/Capital%2oFunding/CF%2oEXEC%
2oSUM%2oFINAL%2026MAY05.pdf. Arsen notes that "the average mileage rate in the poorest 20
percent of school districts is nearly three times higher than the average rate in the richest 20 percent of
districts." Id. at ii.
61. This conclusion was most dramatically corroborated by Jeffrey Metzler in his statistical
analysis of statutory reform of school finance statutes. Metzler found that:
In many states, the distribution of education resources is primarily a function of the
distribution of political power in the state. This distribution is the "equilibrium point," and
in many states it is an inequitable equilibrium insofar as it permits wealthy districts, even at
lower tax rates, to spend more per student than poor districts.
Metzler, supra note 14, at 564. Although a court ruling may temporarily upset that equilibrium point, it
tends to reemerge over time. See id.
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B. JUDICIAL WEARINESS
Although a small number of state courts has long refused to become
embroiled in school funding debates, a new round of "judicial
withdrawal" is emerging, and it presents itself in two different ways.
First, recent cases document a resurgence of the legal doctrine of
nonjusticiability; and, second, other courts have displayed a willingness
to uphold legislative responses to earlier judicial decrees in spite of
evidence that the new statute will not meet the court's previously
announced standard. In conjunction, these related trends suggest that a
sense of weariness with school finance litigation is taking hold in our
state courtrooms.
i. Nonjusticiability
In the tally of plaintiff victories and losses, the doctrine of
nonjusticiabilityf2 has always identified a subset of those that occupy a
place in the loss column. Because of concerns that judicial decision
making would improperly place the court in the middle of an essentially
legislative battle, some state courts held that the claims were
nonjusticiable. For years judicial opinions in Illinois,6 ' Rhode Island,'
Florida,6 ' and Pennsylvania 66 were the standard bearers of this line of
argumentation, while courts in the vast majority of states agreed to
consider the merits of the plaintiffs' adequacy or equality claims. During
the current decade, though, the doctrine appears to have lost its status as
an outlier of limited persuasion and has appeared on the scene with new
vigor.
62. In this Part, I use the term "nonjusticiability" loosely to identify a group of courts for which
involvement in school funding disputes presented sufficiently serious doctrinal or pragmatic concerns
about judicial intervention in essentially legislative affairs as to result in a refusal to consider the
merits of the plaintiffs' claims. Some of the courts meticulously applied the political question standards
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See, e.g.,
Lobato v. State, No. o6CAo733, 2008 WL 19409, at *7-i (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2oo8)
(distinguishing justiciability as a standing doctrine from the political question doctrine); Neb. Coal. for
Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 177-79 (Neb. 2007). Other courts relied on a
range of different concerns, such as separation of powers and judicial activism. See, e.g., Ex parte
James, 836 So. 2d 813 (Ala. 2002). The precise contours and relationship between these related
doctrines, one jurisdictional and one prudential, are beyond the scope of this Article.
63. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d I178 (Il1. 1996).
64. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 59 (R.I. 1995) (reviewing the New Jersey
experience, the court concluded that "[t]he volume of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight
provide a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the duties of a
Legislature").
65. Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 A.2d 400 (Fla. 1996).
66. Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956, 964-65 (Pa. 1998) (reaffirming an earlier supreme
court holding, Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. j979), in which the court found that the plaintiffs
had not presented a justiciable cause of action).
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Since 2002, courts in no fewer than seven states (Alabama, 67
Colorado,6 Kentucky, 6' Montana, 7 Nebraska,7' Ohio,72 and Oklahoma 73)
have dismissed challenges to school funding statutes, articulating
concerns about justiciability, separation of powers, and legislative
prerogative, This list marks a distinct change from the rosier picture
painted by the Supreme Court of Texas, when it noted just four years ago
that only a "few state supreme courts have refused to adjudicate
67. Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813.
68. Lobato v. State, No. o6CAo7 3 3, 2oo8 WL 194019 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008).
69. Plaintiffs in Young v. Williams had asked the court to order the legislature to undertake a cost
study to determine the appropriate level of state funding. See Matthew Samberg, Litigation Update:
Missouri Plaintiffs Testify; Motions in Kentucky, Indiana, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, AccEss QUALITY
Enuc. LITIG. NEWS, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/litigation/2-20-o71itup
date.php3. Although the legislature promptly and substantially increased state funding after the
Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion in Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989), it has never determined the cost of providing the "efficient system" of education guaranteed by
the state constitution. See id.; see also Ky. CoNST. § 183. The trial judge was puzzled by the legislature's
inaction, but concluded that the state constitution's separation of powers provision prevented judicial
involvement. See Samberg, supra. The plaintiffs decided not to appeal. See Nancy C. Rodriguez,
School Funding Suit Over, COURIER J., June 12, 2007, at B I.
70. Stroebe v. State, 127 P.3d io5 (Mont. 2006). In this case, the Montana Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, concluding that the judiciary should
allow the legislature more time to comply with the court's earlier opinion in Columbia Falls
Elementary School District No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257 (Mont. 2005), which held that the state's finance
statute was unconstitutional. Stroebe, 127 P.3 d at 1054. More than fifteen years before Columbia Falls,
in Helena Elementary School District No. i v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 69o-9I (Mont. 1989), the court
invalidated the predecessor school finance statute, which suggests that the legislature may not be quick
to respond to the court's more recent mandate either. Nevertheless, school funding is currently not
justiciable in Montana.
71. Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164 (Neb. 2007).
72. In State ex rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003), the court terminated
its long-running involvement in the DeRolph litigation. In DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 1), 677 N.E.2d
733 (Ohio 1997), the court had invalidated the state's school funding statute under the constitution's
education clause and called for "a complete systematic overhaul." Id. at 747. In subsequent opinions,
the court continued to invalidate Ohio's legislative responses to DeRolph 1. See DeRolph v. State
(DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 111), 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio
2001); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph IV), 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002). In 2003, the court issued a writ of
prohibition to the trial judge in order to "end any further litigation in DeRolph v. State." DeRolph V,
789 N.E.2d at 202. Although the court did nothing to disturb its repeated previous holdings that the
Ohio school finance statutes are fatally flawed, the opinion marked the end of the judiciary's
involvement in the dispute. The court concluded that "[tihe duty now lies with the General Assembly
to remedy an educational system that has been found by the majority in DeRolph IV to still be
unconstitutional." Id.
73. Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Okla. Leg., 158 P.3d 1058 (Okla. 2007).
74. Other state courts have recently taken the opposite position and have agreed to resolve the
merits of the funding dispute. See Carroll-Hall v. Rell, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 224 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007);
Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 885 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Columbia Falls Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 1o9 P.3d 257 (Mont. 2005); Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 176 S.W.3 d 746 (Tex. 2005); Brigham v. State, 889 A.2d 715 (Vt. 2005). Nevertheless, the
increased reliance on nonjusticiability is evident.
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constitutional challenges to public school finance on the ground that the
issues were nonjusticiable political questions."75
In the recent cases, the court's reliance on justiciability has
occasionally been expressed with dramatic prose. Consider, for instance,
the Nebraska Supreme Court: "The landscape is littered with courts that
have been bogged down in the legal quicksand of continuous litigation
and challenges to their states' school funding systems. Unlike those
courts, we refuse to wade into that Stygian swamp." 6 Though perhaps
the Nebraska court's language was unusually colorful, other courts that
have taken the same route have expressed similar concerns. On the more
doctrinal level, some were troubled by the apparent intrusion into the
legislative arena,77 or the sense that judicial decision making would
constitute unwarranted "judicial activism, ' ,, 8 or would be an imprudent
departure from the principle of judicial restraint.79 Other concerns were
more pragmatic. The Oklahoma court, for instance, was deterred by the
prospect of "setting educational policy by imposing mandates on the
Legislature and by continuing to monitor and oversee the Legislature. '
Similarly, Alabama's highest court highlighted the "serious difficulties
implicated by judicial involvement in the administrative details of school
funding"8 and the "obvious impracticalities of judicial oversight. ' '82 For
some courts, the decision to dismiss rested on an unwillingness to make
fiscal decisions about the allocation of limited monetary resources and
set educational policy, along with the fear that stepping into the funding
debate meant a long term commitment of substantial judicial resources
with no guarantee of a clear resolution. The Colorado court, for instance,
noted the "spectre of lengthy and potentially unending litigation,83
shown most dramatically by the experiences of New Jersey, Texas, and
others, that cautioned against entry into the school finance debate. 4
But it is the opinions of the supreme courts of Ohio and Alabama
that should give the most pause to those who seek judicial invalidation of
school funding statutes. In both of those states, the supreme courts
extracted themselves after more than a decade of judicial involvement in
school funding litigation. After protracted fits and starts, with numerous
fractured high court opinions dating to the early 199os, both courts
ultimately retreated from their initial declarations that their state school
75. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 780.
76. Neb. CoaL For Educ. Equity & Adequacy, 731 N.W.2d at 183.
77. Okla. Educ. Ass'n, 158 P.3d at io66.
78. Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 817 (Ala. 2002).
79. Lobato v. State, No. o6CAo733, 2008 WL i94Oi9, at *7 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008).
8o. Okla. Educ. Ass'n, 158 P.3d at io66.
8I. ExparteJames, 836 So. 2d at 817.
82. Id. at 819.
83. Lobato, 2008 WL 194019, at *Ii.
84. Id. at *II-I3
.
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finance statutes violated constitutional guarantees. For Alabama,85 the
decision to "return the Equity Funding Case in toto to its proper forum"
was "a proper and inevitable end."' 6 Similarly, the Ohio"7 court noted
that "[t]he duty now lies with the General Assembly to remedy an
educational system that has been found.. . to still be unconstitutional." 88
Unlike the more common justiciability cases, in which the courts refuse
judicial involvement from the beginning, the Alabama and Ohio opinions
were penned by courts that had taken the initial step to rule on the
constitutionality of their state's school funding statutes, but later had a
change of heart. For these courts to "admit defeat," so to speak, after a
decade or more of involvement, sends a powerful cautionary tale to other
state courts. With more than four decades of judicial opinions from many
states to consider, with repeated iterations of the original case being the
rule rather than the exception, nonjusticiability is likely to find continued
acceptance in state courts.
2. Judicial Approval of Incomplete Funding Reform
Another group of state courts appears unhappy with the endless
back and forth with the legislature but is unwilling to announce the
dramatic pullout exemplified by the supreme courts of Alabama and
Ohio. For those more cautious courts, the way out presents itself when
the legislative response can be deemed "good enough" to end the
lawsuit, notwithstanding evidence that the new laws did not comply with
all elements of the previous judicial decree. In 2007, for example, the
Arkansas Supreme Court approved the legislature's decision to remedy
the school funding formula's deficiencies by appropriating approximately
$200 million in new funding for operating expenses, along with hundreds
of millions of dollars for new facilities." Notwithstanding the enormity of
the allocation, the new law will not remedy the court's earlier insistence
that more state funding "in no way corrects the inherent disparity
between a wealthy school district that can easily raise additional school
85. The lawsuit was filed in 199o and remained pending in circuit court until the supreme court's
dismissal in Ex parte James. See 836 So. 2d at 815 n.i. The supreme court penned no fewer than five
other opinions in that lawsuit over that twelve year span. See Siegelman v. Ala. Ass'n of Sch. Bds., 8i9
So. 2d 568 (Ala. 2001); Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894 (Ala. 1995); Ex parte James, 713
So. 2d 869 (Ala. i997); Opinion of the Justices No. 338,624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); James v. Ala. Coal.
for Equity, Inc., 713 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1997).
86. ExparteJames, 836 So. 2d at 8I9.
87. For a listing of the opinions in the DeRolph litigation, see cases cited supra note 72.
88. State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003). Thus, the court essentially
confirmed that its earlier judicial findings of unconstitutionality in the school finance formula had not
been remedied, while at the same time announcing its unwillingness to continue to spar with the
legislature over the contours of a constitutional finance plan.
89. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 257 S.W.3d 879 (Ark. 2007); see also Matthew
Samberg, Litigation Update: Constitution Satisfied in Arkansas, Mixed Ruling in Alaska, Suit Dropped
in Kentucky, New Hampshire Meets Court Deadline, AccEss QUALiTY EDuc. LTIG. NEws, Jul. 3, 2007,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/litigation/7-3-o7litupdate.php3.
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funds for educational enhancement ... and poorer school districts that
are only offering ... the 'barest necessities."'' " The inherent disparity
may be lessened by the additional funding, but it will never be corrected
so long as local districts retain the ability to raise local revenues for
schools.
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals ruled in 2006 in
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,9' that the nearly $2 billion
appropriated for New York City schools by the state legislature
remedied the state's school funding statute's fatal flaws.92 A dissenting
judge, however, noted that the court had simply put its seal of approval
on what appeared to be the governor's best effort, irrespective of the
court-appointed referees' findings that New York City schools were in
need of $5.6 billion in additional funds.93
Recent settlements in other states reveal similar judicial attitudes. In
Massachusetts, notwithstanding the conclusion of a specially appointed
judge that the state was not meeting its constitutional obligation to
provide an adequate education, a plurality of the supreme court held that
the statutory reforms were sufficient to pass constitutional muster.94
Recognizing that the state had allocated billions of new dollars for
education even while in the midst of "one of the worst budget crises in
decades,"95 the plurality detailed the state's spending patterns and noted
that public education has inevitably felt the effects of years of "sharply
diminished Commonwealth revenues.' '  And in Kansas, in its fifth
opinion in the litigation of Montoy v. State, the supreme court dismissed
the suit and concluded that the state's legislative appropriation of $755
million in new spending satisfied the court's earlier judicial orders.97
Because the Kansas school funding statute continues to authorize local
option budgets, which depend on local property tax efforts, the Kansas
court's earlier insistence that "[t]he education of each similarly situated
student is to be equally funded regardless of where he or she resides,"
g
remains a logical impossibility under the new finance law. In a strongly
worded dissent, Justice Beier criticized the majority's unwillingness to
9o.Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472,497 (Ark. 2002).
91. 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006).
92. Three years earlier, in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 8ol N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003),
the New York court had rejected the state's arguments that its legislative modifications and
appropriations had cured the school finance scheme of its constitutionality.
93. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 63 (Kaye, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
94. Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1136-37 (Mass. 2005). Two other justices
would have found the dispute nonjusticiable, thus producing a majority of five justices unwilling to
overturn the legislative response. Id. at I 159-6o (Corwin, J., concurring in the result).
95. Id. at 1139 (Marshall, C.J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1148; see also id. at 1155.
97. 138 P.3d 755, 764 (Kan. 2006).
98. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170
,
1195 (Kan. 1994).
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assess the constitutionality of the new Kansas law, accusing it of having
put a "good enough for government work"" gloss on the state
constitution's education clause.
The judicial reluctance evident in these approval cases may stem
from well-grounded concerns. In part, it may reflect an unwillingness to
"supervise a large chunk of states' tax collection and resource allocation
functions."'" In addition, it would be foolish to discount the political
reality that an elected state judiciary would be hard-pressed to conclude
that such an enormous amount of money in new dollars for education
was not enough.'' Sensitivity to state fiscal crises may also be at work.' 2
Moreover, if seen as a snapshot in time, the state legislative response
may appear reasonable, and the enormity of the dollars may make it
hard for the court to ask whether the system that produced those dollars
is going to sustain the improvement down the road. In other words, the
courts may be blinded by the dazzle of the current funding and ignore
the important question about the sustainability of the effort.
C. SUMMARY
Taken together, the long-term ineffectiveness of the legislative
response combines with the recent evidence of judicial withdrawal to
dampen enthusiasm about the future course of school finance litigation.
On the surface, these two phenomena may appear unrelated, but I posit
here that both result in part from plaintiffs' failure to seek a precisely
targeted, judicially manageable declaration and remedy.' 3 With regard to
the lack of legislative sustainability, failing to seek the invalidation of the
local property tax means that judicial decrees leave in place the structure
that will once again guarantee a reemergence of the system declared
unconstitutional. No matter how massive the legislative funding increase,
if the local property tax remains a source of school funding, the state
legislature will never move beyond playing catch up. Its efforts will
99. Montoy, 138 P.3d at 771 (Beier, J., dissenting).
ioo. Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L. REV.
857, 914 (2oo6). Professor Saiger posits that adequacy's ascendancy as the legal doctrine of choice for
school funding plaintiffs had to do with their belief that adequacy posed less of a nonjusticiability
threat, a strategic decision that Saiger believes to be erroneous. Id. at 913.
ioi. As the author of the Massachusetts Supreme Court's plurality opinion noted, "It is
significant ... that the Commonwealth has allocated billions of dollars for education reform.
Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at i139.
102. Id. at 1149, 1155.
103. Others have noted that the remedy phase of successful school finance litigation can be
unsatisfactory and incomplete. See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, lbi Remedium: The Fundamental
Right to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2004) (noting that in school
litigation, "it may be true ... that, since the time of Brown, institutional defendants have won the
remedial battle"). Others also noted that plaintiffs should articulate a more specific and detailed
remedy. See Maurice R. Dyson, A Covenant Broken: The Crisis of Educational Remedy for New York
City's Failing Schools, 44 How. L.J. 107, 113-14 (2000).
[Vol. 6o:749
FULL STATE FUNDING OF EDUCATION
perhaps smooth out the rough edges of the state's funding allocation or
eliminate the most glaring unfairness produced by its school finance
statute, but it will not correct the structural inequality inherent in the
local property tax system.
Similarly, the phenomenon of judicial weariness may also reflect the
plaintiffs' decision to eschew a narrow doctrinal declaration. If a court
concludes that its only role in the case is the micromanagement of
difficult questions of educational policy that it feels ill-equipped to
handle, it may choose to forego judicial involvement altogether. It seems,
then, that at least some responsibility for the disappointing results lies in
the structure of the original lawsuits and their wide-ranging claims that
would involve the court in the dispute about the meaning of the state's
constitutional duty to provide education.' 4
In an earlier article, I suggested that the uniformity of taxation
clause could be used to raise a doctrinal challenge to school finance
statutes.' 5 This principle provides a narrow basis of judicial decision with
a clear identification of the source of the statute's unconstitutionality,
establishes the straightforward requirement of full state funding of
education, and transfers the responsibility for determining a
constitutional education spending formula to the state legislature. Thus,
it removes the court from the debates over educational policy and how
the state can best allocate its limited resources to implement that policy.
In the next Part I elaborate on how that argument could be the catalyst
for overhaul of school funding formulas without requiring the court to
immerse itself in the "Stygian swamp" so feared by some state courts.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF FULL STATE FUNDING
A. UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION
All state constitutions have been interpreted as requiring state taxes
to be uniform.'° In some, the uniformity clause is an explicit textual limit.
The Illinois Constitution is typical, requiring that "taxes upon real
property shall be levied uniformly."'" In others, the same limit on state
discretion has been implied through different constitutional clauses, such
as the equal protection clause' or prohibition of special legislation."'°
Whatever the source, the meaning of the limit is clear: disparate state tax
104. See Ryan, supra note 9, at 1255-57 (arguing that as a matter of institutional competence,
courts are better equipped to measure inputs than outputs).
io5. See Reynolds, Uniformity, supra note 8, at 1844-45.
io6. See 71 AM. JUR. 20 State and Local Taxation § 113 (20o1); 16 McQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 44.19
(3d ed. 1984); RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 66o-81 (7th ed. 2009).
107. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a).
lo8. See, e.g., Medlock v. Leathers, 842 S.W.2d 428, 430-31 (Ark. 1992).
lO9. See, e.g., Desenco, Inc. v. City of Akron, 706 N.E.2d 323,330 (Ohio 1999).
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rates that further no rational purpose are unconstitutional. In some states
any variation is impermissible, in others the classification will be upheld
if reasonable, but in all states, variations in state tax rate based solely on
geography are facially invalid.'
Local property tax rates for school revenues are decidedly and
notoriously lacking in uniformity. But before the uniformity clause can
apply to invalidate them, the key doctrinal question requires a
determination of the level at which the uniformity clause should apply. If
the municipality is the taxing jurisdiction, uniformity will require no
more than a showing that intramunicipal rates are uniform. In contrast, if
the state is deemed the taxing unit, intermunicipal property tax rate
variation cannot survive a uniformity challenge."' Thus, the uniformity
theory advanced here crucially hinges on the argument that municipal
property taxes levied for schools are actually state, and not local, taxes.
In the absence of a state duty to provide education, the uniformity
clause would indeed apply at the level of the local taxing jurisdiction.
Statewide variation in local tax rates would be an unexceptional example
of local initiative, much as state authorization of local sales tax power
authorizes local governments to respond to local service, tax, and
expenditure preferences in the determination of the proper local tax rate.
It is the state constitution's education clause,"2 however, which explicitly
puts the duty to provide education on the state and thus answers the
question about taxing jurisdiction. Purportedly local taxes for education
must be considered as part of the state's implementation of its duty and
should be evaluated as state taxes. No transfer of the state's sovereign
power to its political subdivisions can change the fact that the revenue
generated by those taxes is collected in furtherance of the state's
nondelegable constitutional duty."3
i to. See, e.g., State v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 275 S.W.2d 225, 234 (Mo. 1955) ("Certainly
whether property, of the same value and in this same District, is located in the City or the County is
not a reasonable basis for classification for taxation .... To make this the sole basis for a different
amount of tax on the same valuation for the same purpose would be palpably arbitrary and
unreasonable."); accord Jarvill v. City of Eugene, 613 P.2d 1, 18 (Or. 198o) ("[Cilassification based on
location is impermissible.").
i i i. As the Indiana Supreme Court noted:
Uniformity in rate ... means that the same rate shall apply alike to all in any given
taxing district. This means that as a general proposition, (the uniformity of taxation
provision] requires that a tax for a state purpose must be uniform and equal throughout the
state, a tax for a county purpose must be uniform and equal throughout the county, and so
forth.
Dep't of Local Gov't Fin. v. Griffin. 784 N.E.2d 448, 452-53 (Ind. 2003) (citations omitted); see also
Kankakee County Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 544 N.E.2d 762, 771 (Ill. 1989); Thomas v.
Kingsley, 2o6 A.2d 161, 165 (N.J. 1965).
112. All state constitutions require the state to provide education to its citizens. See Dayton &
Dupre, supra note 7, at 2356 n.13.
113. Though the argument may seem straightforward, the lack of analogies in the case law makes a
standard doctrinal defense more challenging. Education is sui generis: it is in fact the only affirmative
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B. LOCAL CONTROL MEETS STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
i. Local Control as Flawed Policy
As the Supreme Court has noted, local control has a long and
venerable tradition in school funding."' Yet, because of the widespread
variation of property wealth among communities, this tradition
inevitably results in significant financial inequality. And as American
communities become more highly sorted along socioeconomic lines, that
local control becomes more selectively available."5 This more sinister
meaning of local control has been well documented by courts and
commentators. The Supreme Court of California, for instance, referred
to it as a "cruel illusion"",6 for the many poor districts that tax themselves
at very high rates to generate far fewer revenues than their wealthy
counterparts."' Similarly, in the first of its five school funding opinions in
DeRolph v. State, the Ohio Supreme Court described the local control
argument as a clich.'' s And in fact, in the current age of pervasive,
indeed some would say overwhelming, state regulation of education, it
duty that has been placed on the state in most state constitutions. The argument's novelty then, derives
from the fact that the state constitutional structure singles out education as an affirmative state
obligation. Once that duty has been explicitly entrusted to the state, the debate about its
implementation cannot ignore the transformation of state sovereignty that follows from the textual
commitment. In fact, it is the failure to recognize how the uniformity clause argument crucially
depends on the education clause for both its force and its limit that produces judicial rejection of the
claim. For a discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's uniformity analysis, see infra text
accompanying notes 135-47.
114. The Court stated:
In part, local control means.., the freedom to devote more money to the education of
one's children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity it offers for participation in
the decisionmaking process that determines how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each
locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism also affords some
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational
excellence.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 t U.S. 1, 49-50 (973).
115. In a recent study, the authors found that socioeconomic segregation among local governments
in metropolitan regions is continuing to increase. See TODD SWANSTROM ET AL., BROOKINGS INST.,
PULLING APART: ECONOMIC SEGREGATION AMONG SUBURBS AND CENTRAL CITIES IN MAJOR
METROPOLITAN AREAS 1 (2004), available at http:/lwww.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2004/
iometropolitanpolicy-swanstrom/2004ioi8_econsegregation.pdf. Between 199o and 2000, the
percentage of communities in metropolitan areas that could be characterized as middle class suburbs
decreased from 75% to 61%. Id. at I, 9-1o. Those suburbs falling out of middle class status became
either "rich" or "poor" communities, thus creating larger numbers of both winners and losers in the
local property tax system. Id. at i.
1i6. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 126o (Cal. 1971). The supreme courts of Arkansas,
Tennessee, and Vermont share that view of local control. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651
S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d i39, 155 (Tenn. 1993);
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384,396 (Vt. 1997).
117. In Serrano, for instance, although the community of Baldwin Park taxed itself at a tax rate
that was more than twice the tax rate levied on property in Beverly Hills, the revenues generated by
that much higher tax rate were less than half the amount produced in Beverly Hills. See Serrano, 487
P.2d at 126o.
118. 677 N.E.2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997).
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makes little sense to reserve the rally cry of local control for school
funding options."9 Whatever local control of education could potentially
mean in terms of policy making and substantive local regulation,'20 it is
more than a little ironic that the term has become shorthand for the
preservation of the most undemocratic feature of public education in the
United States."' When local control means that poor communities are
unable to generate enough money for their schools even after levying
substantially higher tax rates than their richer counterparts, or when it
means that local taxpayers have the option to underfund education, the
luster of the tradition begins to fade.'
The normative weaknesses of local control become more glaring
when its empirically inaccurate assumptions are added to the mix.
Defenders of local control assert that when the government funds
education, people who value education highly will choose one of two
scenarios. If they desire to send their children to public schools, they will
seek a community with high taxes and high spending on education. In
contrast, if they opt to buy a private school education, they will choose a
local home with low taxes and low spending on schools. This bimodal
model of choice 3 is of limited applicability.
For one thing, the model is incomplete: either it is based on the
assumption that the only people who value education are those with
money; or it has failed to account for people without money who value
education. 4 As an empirical matter, moreover, the choice defense of
i19. Both state and federal laws impose numerous regulatory burdens on school districts. See
BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 106, at 423-24; Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial
Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State Judicial
Review of Education Finance, 6o U. PITr. L. REV. 231, 280-82 (1998); Charles F. Faber, Is Local
Control of the Schools Still a Viable Option?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 447,450-58 (I9i).
12o. For a discussion of how local control might be detached from property wealth, see Reynolds,
Uniformity, supra note 8, at 1889-93. In fact, equalized, wealth-neutral school funding laws would
provide more, rather than less, local control. See Dupree, 651 S.W.2d at 93; Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989).
121. As one critic of the public schools recently argued, "lilt is hard to imagine a more
undemocratic system of public schooling than one that effectively limits to the affluent the opportunity
to choose the best school for one's children." Paul R. Dimond, School Choice and the Democratic
Ideal of Free Common Schools, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 323, 323-24 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin
Lazerson eds., 2005).
122. For a more thorough review of the shortcomings of the local control argument, see Reynolds,
Uniformity, supra note 8, at 1886-93.
123. The model is based on based on premises of economic theory and supports local funding and
service provisions with as little centralization as possible, in order to preserve a range of options for
citizens, also referred to as "consumer voters." See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,419 (1956). The model has been criticized on many fronts. See, e.g.,
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 9o COLUM. L. REV. 346, 399-435
(i990); Richard C. Schragger, Consuming Government, ioi MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1825-27 (2003).
124. As Professor Jerry Frug sensibly noted, "[pleople who live in unsafe neighborhoods or send
their children to inadequate schools don't do so because they have taste for them .... If they had a
choice..., they would prefer better schools and less crime." Gerald Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L.
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local control inaccurately describes the options actually available to
those who search for a home. Individuals with the financial resources to
exercise a meaningful choice of residence need not accept a high tax rate
in order to live in a school district that spends heavily on education.
Their rational choice will be to move to a wealthy community that can
generate high revenues with a lower tax rate.'25 On the other side of the
choice equation, those who seek a low spending jurisdiction are likely to
find that school districts that spend below average on schools do not levy
a low tax rate. In fact, these low spending school districts levy a high rate
on the low value property within their district, with the result that they
generate far fewer dollars than the wealthy districts that tax low. Thus,
the economic model on which local control rests fails to describe the real
choices offered to consumers who make their selection of residence
based on the relationship between property tax rate and total district
funding for education.
2. Local Control as Flawed Legal Doctrine
Notwithstanding its normative incompleteness and empirical
inaccuracy, local control continues to undergird the rejection of the
uniformity challenge articulated here. The legal doctrinal argument goes
something along these lines: when the state taxes to generate revenues
for education, the uniformity clause applies to guarantee that the
statewide rate is uniform. Local property taxes for schools, in contrast,
are levied by school districts, which have no constitutional obligation to
impose them. Thus, they are local, and not state, taxes, and as a result,
the interlocal lack of uniformity is not unconstitutional under the
uniformity clause. The uniformity clause applies, but only to guarantee
intralocal, and not interlocal, uniformity.
, Though it may enjoy widespread support, this defense of local
property taxation for schools is inconsistent with two foundational
principles of state and local government law. First of all, local
governments are creatures of the state, they exist at the discretion of the
state, and they are subject to the state's total control over the scope of
their powers and attributes.16 Local control, to the extent school districts
may exercise it, is not inherent or untouchable. It has been conferred on
local districts by the state and can be taken away by the state as well. As
the Supreme Court of Wyoming explained, "local control is not a
REV. 23,31 (1998).
125. A Government Accountability Office study describes how, in Minnesota, the wealthiest to%
of school districts raised on average six times more revenue than the poorest to%, even though the
poorest districts' tax rates were about 25% higher. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SCHOOL
FINANCE: THREE STATES' EXPERIENCES WITH EQUITY IN SCHOOL FUNDING 5 (I995).
126. That foundational principle of state and local government law was first articulated by the
Supreme Court in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. i61 (1907). See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra
note io6, at 70-98.
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constitutionally recognized interest and cannot be the basis for disparity
in equal educational opportunity." '' 7 And in fact, the erosion of local
control has made its way into other state court school finance cases, with
some courts refusing to let the state hide behind it to avoid responsibility
for the failure of its political subdivisions."'.
The second principle, admittedly less a part of the analytical tools of
common legal discourse, is the rule that state constitutions are limits on
what would otherwise be unlimited inherent state sovereign power.
Unlike the more familiar federal constitutional model, in which the
federal government's powers were transferred to it by the states and are
enumerated in the Constitution, state powers emanate from the state's
inherent sovereignty and need no constitutional articulation."9 State
constitutions, then, are not sources or grants of sovereign power, but
rather they are limits on the state's preconstitutional unencumbered
discretion. Although it occasionally produces counterintuitive results,
especially in light of common principles of statutory construction, 30 the
"limit not grant" principle of state and local government law' 3' means
that if a particular limit has not been placed in a state constitution, the
state is free to exercise its sovereignty as it wishes. Once a limit has been
articulated in the constitution, though, all state exercises of power are
circumscribed by the constitutional mandate.
Before the adoption of an education clause, the state could have
chosen to provide education or not, or to transfer all powers over
education to a political subdivision. The duty to provide education, which
127. Campbell 1, 907 P.2d 1238, 1270 (Wyo. 1995).
128. A lower court in the recent litigation over school funding in New York City said it most
categorically: "[T]he State Constitution reposes responsibility to provide a sound basic education with
the State, and if the State's subdivisions act to impede the delivery of a sound basic education it is the
State's responsibility under the constitution to remove such impediments." Campaign for Fiscal Equity
v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 527-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); see also Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont 11), 703 A.2d 1353, 136o (N.H. 1997) ("[T]he State cannot use local control as a
justification for allowing the existence of educational services below the level of constitutional
adequacy.").
129. For one of the many Supreme Court articulations of this principle, see United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). "The powers delegated by the... Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which ... remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite." Id.
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison)).
130. In the interpretation of a statute, "[t]he doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius 'as
applied to statutory interpretation creates a presumption that when a statute designates certain
persons, things, or manners of operation, all omissions should be understood as exclusions."' Silvers v.
Sony Pictures Entm't, 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Omissions from state
constitutions carry no similar implication of prohibition or exclusion. Thus, a state constitutional
provision authorizing the legislature to allow absentee voting for electors in military service was not
deemed to implicitly prohibit the establishment of absentee voting for all state citizens. See Gangemi v.
Berry, 134 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1957).
13 1. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 1 i9, at 47-50.
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is articulated in every state constitution,'32 however, is an explicit limit on
that original sovereign discretion. Its application does not mean that the
state cannot authorize its political subdivisions to implement its duty, but
it does lead to the conclusion that all actions implementing the
constitutionally based duty, irrespective of the actual level of government
at which the duty is operationalized, should be considered exercises of
state power.'33 Thus, the key point is that the uniformity clause should
invalidate disparate local property tax rates for schools, not because all
local taxes must be uniform across the state, but because education has
been made a state duty, and the state should not be able to circumvent
that obligation by authorizing its political subdivisions to provide
education in a manner that the state would be unable to undertake for
lack of uniformity."' Stated succinctly, any transfer of the state's
sovereign power over education to the local school district can only be a
transfer of governmental power as limited by the state constitution.
C. THE LEGACY OF ROBINSON V. CAHILL
The New Jersey Supreme Court's long-lasting involvement with
school finance reform began with Robinson v. Cahill.'35 In that case, the
first of its at least twenty-three modern school finance opinions,' the
court gave the plaintiffs a victory with its holding that the state's school
finance statute did not comply with its constitutional mandate to provide
a "thorough and efficient" education.'37 At the same time, though, the
court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the wide variation in
school district property tax rates across the state violated the
constitution's tax uniformity clause.' 3s An examination of the court's
doctrinal analysis will highlight its failure to make a crucial interpretative
connection and will clarify the key points necessary for a successful
uniformity challenge.
132. See supra note 112.
133. See Claremont 11, 703 A.2d at 1356.
134. A corollary principle is that the state cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited to do directly.
If, for instance, a state constitution prohibits state adoption of a particular tax, the state cannot
circumvent that limitation by authorizing one of its political subdivisions to implement the tax. See
Chanin v. Bibb County, 216 S.E.2d 250, 253-54 (Ga. 1975). Similarly, if the state is incapable of
passing a certain type of statute or regulation, it cannot avoid that restriction on its sovereignty by
purporting to authorize one of its political subdivisions to exercise the desired power. Ark. Game &
Fish Comm'n v. Clark, 96 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Ark. 1936); Clark v. Miller, 105 So. 502, 504 (Miss. 1925).
135. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
136. See Liss ET AL., supra note 35, at 5-6 (listing six supreme court opinions on Robinson v. Cahill,
followed by seventeen in the follow-up Abbott v. Burke litigation).
137. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 298.
138. The New Jersey Constitution provides that: "Property shall be assessed for taxes ... by
uniform rules .... " N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § i, i. In its invalidation of the New Jersey statute, the
lower court used the uniformity argument suggested here. See Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 217
(N.J. Super. 1972), affd as modified, 303 A.2d 273, 273.
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The Robinson court's rejection of the uniformity argument began
with an accurate description of the plaintiffs' claim:
They say that since the [thorough and efficient clause] imposed the
school obligation on the State itself, a tax levied to discharge that
obligation must be deemed a "State" tax rather than a "local" one and
hence, if it is to fall upon property, must fall uniformly upon all taxable
property throughout the State. 39
At this point in the opinion, the court explicitly acknowledged that the
plaintiffs' argument rested on the interaction between two important
constitutional provisions, the education clause and the tax clause. Its
response to that argument bears repeating in full because in it the court
ignored the crucial connection that it had just highlighted.
The short answer is that the tax clause was not intended to say that a
State function may not be delegated to local government to be met by
local taxation. As we noted in Point I, local government is simply an
arm of the State with respect to the many State functions which the
State decides shall be performed through local government. The tax
clause does not restrict the State with respect to that decision. Rather it
means that if the State decides to handle a service at State level and to
do so on the basis of a property tax, it must tax all taxable property in
the State rather than only property in a part of the State; and that if the
responsibility for the State function is assigned to local government,
the local tax must fall uniformly upon all taxable property within the
county or the municipality as the case may be. 4
The New Jersey court's response to the plaintiffs' argument is
incomplete; it treats the tax clause in isolation and ignores the important
fact that the uniformity claim depended essentially on the education
clause for its doctrinal hook. Though the court was correct to note that
"the tax clause was not intended to say that a State function may not be
delegated to local government,".'4 ' that assertion is not responsive to the
plaintiffs' argument. The missing next step was to ask whether the
education clause limits the state's discretion to transfer powers over
education to the local school district. Because the tax clause applies to a
constitutional structure in which the education clause has already
imposed an explicit and affirmative obligation on the state and thus
limited its inherent sovereign power, the answer to that question is yes.
In fact, the situation described by the Robinson court in this crucial
paragraph accurately portrays the unencumbered discretion the state
would have over education in the absence of an education clause; thus,
its analysis effectively reads the education clause out of the state
139. 303 A.2d at 288.
14o. Id.
141. Id. The court essentially repeated that assertion at the end of its tax clause discussion,
concluding that the uniformity provision had "nothing to do with the question whether the State may
assign a State obligation to local government for discharge by it by use of revenues raised locally." Id.
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constitution. When the court referred to the state's freedom to decide "to
handle a service at the state level,' 4. it ignored the reality that, at least
with regard to public education, the state constitution has already made
that decision for the state. Because the education clause is a limit on its
sovereignty, the State of New Jersey can no longer choose to "handle" or
not to "handle" education, and the Robinson court ignored that essential
point.
Although the New Jersey court was unwilling to dismantle New
Jersey's local property tax system, the plaintiffs did obtain a favorable
disposition of their education clause claim, as the court agreed that the
state had not "fulfilled its obligation to afford all pupils that level of
instructional opportunity which is comprehended by a thorough and
efficient system of education."'43 Somewhat mysteriously, especially in
light of its rejection of the uniformity argument, the court elaborated that
"education is a State and not a local responsibility,"'" and that the State
must assume "the cost of providing the constitutionally mandated
education""'4 before it can authorize "local government to go further and
to tax to that further end, provided that such authorization does not
become a device for diluting the State's mandated responsibility."'' 6 In
essence, the court appears to have both endorsed local property tax
levies as a permissible means of funding schools under the uniformity of
taxation clause and condemned the inequality they produce under the
education clause. As the next thirty-five years and at least twenty-two
more supreme court opinions suggest, walking that fine line has proven
to be enormously complicated and remains unresolved.'47 In hindsight, it
appears that the Robinson court did not send the state of New Jersey
down a very productive path.
D. SUMMARY
Courts are increasingly uneasy about their role in school finance
litigation, and understandably so. The results over the last forty years
give scant basis for the prediction of a satisfactory resolution. The
prospect of decades of litigation, repeated back and forths with the
legislature, and ultimate uncertainty about how much money a state
should spend on education are contributing to a reassessment of the
wisdom of judicial involvement. This reassessment has resulted in a new
round of justiciability cases as well as a group of judicial "seals of
approval" on legislative funding and programs that have the advantage
142. Id.
143. Id. at 295.
144. Id. at 297.
145. Id. at 298.
146. Id.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 35-46.
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of providing huge increases in money to the state's neediest districts but
do nothing to accomplish a systematic overhaul of the funding scheme
that created the problem in the first place.
The uniformity of taxation argument suggests a way out of this
conundrum. A judicial decision along those lines would go straight to the
heart of the school funding system because it would invalidate the local
property tax on which most state funding schemes are based. In addition,
it would establish the important corollary that full state funding of
education is constitutionally required, irrespective of the type of revenue
raising device used. Though perhaps dramatic or even explosive in its
immediate impact,' 48 it would give the legislature no alternative to the
statutory overhaul that courts seem to expect yet never require.'49 In
addition, it has the pragmatic advantage of removing the court from the
essentially legislative determination of how much of the state budget
schools can fairly command. It would insure that the dollars that are
available for education would be allocated on the basis of legislatively
determined criteria, rather than, as is currently the case, on the basis of
the wealth of the school district, with some state catch-up dollars thrown
in to offset the anti-equalizing forces of unequal property wealth. As a
result, the uniformity of taxation argument may offer a realistic
alternative for those courts that are dismayed by the deficiencies of their
state's school funding system yet unwilling to follow the path of those
states that are now entering their fourth decade of school finance
litigation.'50
III. THE PROMISE OF FULL STATE FUNDING AS A JUDICIAL MANDATE
A. THE STATE OF FULL STATE FUNDING
For the most part, plaintiff victories in school funding cases have
been met with legislative supplementation of the local budgets of the
poorest and/or worst performing school districts.'5 ' For most courts, this
is an acceptable solution, and it means that the state's duty is triggered
only when, and only to the extent that, local funding is incapable of
148. Professor James Ryan uses the term "political dynamite" to describe and reject efforts to limit
or eliminate local property tax funding of schools. Ryan, supra note 9, at 1253. Though the term may
accurately describe the legislative reality, the five states examined in this Article have made such
changes to varying degrees.
149. See, e.g., Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 445 (N.J. 1997) ("Only comprehensive and systemic relief
will bring about enduring reform."); DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ohio 2002) (reiterating that
DeRolph I called for "a complete systematic overhaul" of the school-funding system in order to enact
a truly "thorough and efficient" school-funding scheme).
15o. An Illinois trial court is currently wrestling with this issue. The Chicago Urban League's
lawsuit against the State of Illinois makes the uniformity of taxation argument that I propose in this
Article. See Amended Complaint at 39-41, Chicago Urban League v. Illinois, No. 2OO8-CH-30 4 90 (I11.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2o8).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 22-49.
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producing the revenues necessary to satisfy the court that its state's
public education meets constitutional standards. The Ohio Supreme
Court's mandate is typical: "When a [school] district falls short of the
constitutional requirement that the system be thorough and efficient, it is
the state's obligation to rectify it."' 52 State supplementation of local
revenues leaves the local property tax system untouched, and the
legislative responses come from behind to mitigate the worst of the
inequalities in property tax wealth and to correct the most egregious of
the inadequacies.
As early as 1978, however, the Washington Supreme Court began to
stake out a different course. The court's opinion in Seattle School District
No. i v. State directed the legislature to "make ample provision for basic
education [with] sufficient funds, derived through dependable and regular
tax sources."'5 3 In what seemed to be a fatal blow to the local property
tax system, the court concluded that local property taxes imposed by the
voters of the district as "special excess levies" to supplement state
funding, did not constitute a dependable and regular tax source.' 4 Taken
at face value, the court appeared to have concluded that only state-
generated revenues could be used for fulfillment of the state's
constitutional obligation to provide education.
Since the Washington court's holding in Seattle School District No. i,
judicial opinions in Wyoming, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Kansas
have adopted similar full state funding mandates. Though they not have
received much fanfare for the novelty and punch of their doctrinal bases,
they stake out new ground with their important conclusion that because
the duty to provide education rests solely with the state, local tax efforts
must be excluded from an assessment of the state's compliance. This is a
noteworthy reformulation of the state's duty because it appears to rule
out the typical catch-up legislative response and require elimination of
the state's reliance on local revenues.
Wyoming was the second state to adopt a full state funding mandate.
In Washakie County School District No. i v. Herschler, the Wyoming
Supreme Court insisted that a constitutional school finance statute "must
not create a level of spending which is a function of wealth other than the
wealth of the state as a whole."'' 5 Next, in 1997, the Vermont Supreme
152. DeRolph , 677 N.E.2d 733,745 (Ohio 1997).
153. 585 P.2d 71, 98 (Wash. 1978).
154. Id. In 196o, special levies constituted a mere 6.8% of total school maintenance and operating
costs in Washington. Id. By 1974/1975, it had increased to 25.6%. Id.
155. 606 P.2d 310, 336 (Wyo. i98o). It has taken nearly thirty years for the legislature to implement
that mandate. A second round of litigation began with Campbell 1, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995). In 2008,
the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the state school funding statute had finally met its full
state funding standard of wealth neutrality. See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State (Campbell IV),
18r P.3d 43, 73 (Wyo. 2008).
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Court laid the groundwork for the legislature's swift adoption of a full
state funding approach to education when it invalidated its school
finance statute, which was heavily reliant on local property taxes."6 In
Brigham v. State, the court noted that "[p]ublic education is a
constitutional obligation of the state; funding of education through
locally-imposed property taxes is not,"'.57 and stressed that the Vermont
Constitution "does not allow a system in which educational opportunity
is necessarily a function of district wealth."' 8 Then came the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, with its declaration that the state constitution
"imposes upon the State the exclusive obligation to fund a
constitutionally adequate education.""'9 The court also noted that "[t]he
State may not shift any of this constitutional responsibility to local
communities."' 6 Most recently, the Kansas Supreme Court agreed. The
court's opinion in Montoy v. State invalidated the state finance law for its
reliance on local funding, noting that it could not be used as a "substitute
for the state funding the legislature is obligated to provide" and that a
constitutional level of state funding must "pre-exist the local tax
initiatives."
'
'
6
'
Judicial pronouncement of a wealth-neutral school finance scheme
fully funded by the state is one thing; judicial enforcement or legislative
implementation is another. And in fact, an evaluation of the current
status of school funding in these five states shows that the results are
mixed and that there is still a long way to go. Of the five, three leave
enough cracks in their stated mandate of wealth neutrality to suspect that
erosion of the full state funding standard is inevitable. In contrast, the
efforts of courts and legislatures in two states, Wyoming and Vermont,
illustrate the potential of full state funding for sustainable school finance
reform.
i. Starting Down the Full State Funding Path in Washington,
Kansas, and New Hampshire
Starting with Washington, now thirty years after the court's holding
in Seattle School District No. i, the state has yet to undertake a cost
assessment to determine "how much it costs to provide the
Constitutionally required basic education to every child residing in
[Washington]." '' 6' Nor has it eliminated the local property tax levies,
which continue to provide as much as one-third of some districts'
156. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 386 (Vt. 1997).
157. Id. at 392.
158. Id. at 397.
159. Opinion of the Justices, 765 A.2d 673,676 (N.H. 2o00).
z6o. Id.
16i. 112 P.3d 923,937 (Kan. 2005).
162. Petition for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 26, 104.
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budgets.6 Lawsuits filed in 2006 and 2007 seek, yet again, .to force the
state to live up to its constitutional obligation.6 But so long as the local
levies are permitted, the full state funding system demanded by the court
in 1978 is impossible to achieve. In no small part, the Seattle School
District No. i court's failure to focus on the preservation of the local
property tax system to supplement state spending left in place a funding
structure that is incompatible with its full state funding mandate.
Unlike Washington, where a new generation of litigation is just
beginning, the Kansas Supreme Court's involvement with its full state
funding mandate recently concluded. Its 2006 opinion in Montoy v. State
announced that the court has had its fill of school finance litigation.'6' In
this, its fifth opinion in the long-lasting litigation, the court dismissed the
appeal and released jurisdiction over the case, concluding that the
legislation passed in response to an earlier opinion was in "substantial
compliance" with its orders in the case. 66 At the same time, though, the
court noted that some of the state funding remains predicated on a local
district's willingness to levy a local property tax. 6' As both the concurring
and dissenting justices noted, that means that local funds are used to
satisfy the state's constitutional obligation, which is something that the
earlier Montoy opinions had deemed unacceptable.' 68 The Kansas court's
majority opinion, in reality, appears to be based more on its appreciation
of the enormous additional legislative outlays for education, 6, its distaste
for continuing involvement in complex policy issues,"' and its acceptance
of the state's argument that the full impact of this three year plan will
take time to be realized."' Unfortunately, the preservation of the local
option budget means that the unraveling of the highly equalized and fully
state funded system may be but a matter of time. Following in the path of
Washington may be inevitable as the years progress and the immediacy
of the school funding crisis recedes in the public's, and the court's, mind.
Although it may be too early to tell what the future will bring in
New Hampshire, the most recent news from the state legislature and the
supreme court indicates that the court's insistence on a fully state-funded
adequate education will shift the sources of funding around, perhaps, but
163. See Rachel Tunistra, State's Unequal World of School Funding, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 21, 2006,
at BI.
164. See supra note 26.
165. 138 P.3d 755, 762 (Kan. 2006); see supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
166. Id. at 765.
167. Id. at 760, 761.
168. Id. at 768-69 (Rosen, J., concurring); id. at 771 (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
169. Id. at 763 (majority opinion) (noting that the estimated annual increase in funding totals
$755.6 million).
170. Id. at 765-66.
171. Id. at 766.
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will not accomplish systemic reform of New Hampshire's wealth-based
school finance system.' 7' Although the New Hampshire standard of
wealth neutrality for school funding is one of the most absolute and
uncompromising of any state court opinion, 73 its limited scope means
that it loses much of its punch when it comes to actual funding. That is
because the supreme court has concluded that the full state funding
obligation extends only to the provision of a constitutionally adequate
education. Once the school funding formula gets "[b]eyond
constitutional adequacy, ' 74 local school districts may dedicate additional
resources to their schools, and the gaps between rich and poor are likely
to escape constitutional condemnation.
2. Adherence to the Full State Funding Principle in Wyoming and
Vermont
Of the five full state funding states, Wyoming and Vermont hold out
the most promise for long-term sustainable reform and the possibility
that judicial involvement may actually be unnecessary in the future. In
Wyoming, the reforms were long in coming, requiring six supreme court
opinions chiding reluctant legislatures over the course of nearly thirty
years.'75 In Vermont, in contrast, the state legislature took the initiative
to adopt a more far reaching reform than its supreme court appeared to
have required.
Although legislative reform in both Vermont and Wyoming adheres
to the full state funding standard, Wyoming has been the most
unwavering in its commitment to the principle. As early as 1980, the
172. According to the Education Trust, which publishes an annual report on the revenue gaps
between wealthy and poor school districts across the country, as of 2005 New Hampshire's system had
the fourth worst gap between highest and lowest poverty districts. See ARROYO, supra note 2, at 9.
173. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 765 A.2d 673, 676 (N.H. 2000) (concluding that the state
education clause "imposes upon the State the exclusive obligation to fund a constitutionally adequate
education," and insisting that "[t]he State may not shift any of this constitutional responsibility to local
communities"); Claremont 11, 703 A.2d 1353, 1357 (N.H. 1997) (ruling that property taxes levied for
the funding of schools are state and not local taxes, and thus are invalid under the uniformity of
taxation clause).
174. Opinion of the Justices, 765 A.2d at 677.
175. In Washakie County School District No. i v. Herschler, 6o6 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo. i98o), the
court first announced its wealth-neutral standard of full state funding. Fifteen years later, in Campbell
1, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995), the court invalidated many of the post-Washakie legislative changes for
failure to conform to the Washakie standard. In State v. Campbell County School District (Campbell
II), the court recognized that the legislature had made great progress, but invalidated some funding
formulas for their failure to "accurately reflect the cost" to the district. 19 P.3d 518, 540 (Wyo. 2001).
On rehearing, the court tackled the school facilities funding problem. State v. Campbell County Sch.
Dist. (Campbell IMI), 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001). Finally, in 2008, the court undertook a detailed review
of numerous funding formulas, including maintenance and operations, at risk students, vocational
education, small school adjustment, small district adjustment, and regional cost of living adjustment,
terminating its jurisdiction and concluding that "the legislature has in place a thorough and efficient
educational structure funded from state wealth as required by our state constitution." Campbell IV,
I81 P.3d 43, 48 (Wyo. 2oo8).
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Wyoming Supreme Court articulated a firm standard of wealth neutrality
in school funding.' In the years following that opinion, the legislature
adopted numerous modifications to its funding statute, yet within a
decade of the original opinion, the gap between the top and bottom
school districts had increased from $2360 to $13,oi6, reflecting the state's
increasing reliance on the local property tax.'77 Another round of
litigation began, with the supreme court holding the wealth neutrality
line. In its first opinion in Campbell County School District v. State, the
court invalidated various components of the state's revised school
finance statute, including its recapture provision, its provision for
optional local levies,'79 its capital construction plan,'8 and its revenue
distribution formula.'8 ' The court repeatedly stressed its commitment to
wealth neutrality, instructing the legislature that funding and spending
disparities can survive only if they are justified by "educational cost
differentials. ' ' "s2 Six years later, the court repeated its commitment to full
state funding and invalidated several new statutory provisions."" Finally,
in early 2008, the Wyoming Supreme Court terminated the litigation,
satisfied that all funding formulas of the state's school finance system
were "devoid of wealth-based disparities ''84 and reflected only
"differences in the cost of providing education.""'8 The course of school
funding in Wyoming should receive careful attention over the coming
years. If the state statute retains its exclusively cost-justified differentials
for allocation of education funds and preserves the full state funding of
those revenues,' 86 the trajectory should be quite different than the typical
176. Washakie, 6o6 P.2d at 336.
177. Campbell 1, 907 P.2d at 1251 n.13.
178. Id. at 1268-69.
179. Id. at 1269-70.
t8o. Id. at 1274-75.
181. Id. at 1276-77.
182. Id. at 1276.
183. Campbell II, 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001). For instance, the court invalidated the state's funding
formula for administrator salaries because it bore "little relationship to the actual costs incurred by
any Wyoming school district and results in funding disparities for which the state has shown no
compelling state interest." Id. at 543-44. A rehearing and follow-up opinion focused on the application
of the wealth neutrality standard to facilities funding. Campbell 111, 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001).
184. Campbell IV, 181 P.3d 43, 50 (Wyo. 2008).
185. Id. at 49.
186. The Wyoming court has not indicated its opinion on local supplementation since Campbell I,
when it expressed doubt about its legitimacy. In that case, the court suggested that local
supplementation would be impermissible unless the legislature had a "compelling reason," 907 P.2d at
1274. In addition, it noted that using the district power equalizer on optional mills seemed permissible.
Id. at 1274 n.4o. The court then went on to "inject two notes of caution," suggesting first that local
enhancement levies may be unconstitutional in and of themselves. Id. at 1274. Second, it observed that
because the "definition of a proper education is not static," the innovations and improvements funded
by "local enhancements," might well become part of the state's constitutional obligation to all districts.
Id.
March 20091
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
school finance litigation, in which inequality and inadequacy resurface
rather quickly.
In contrast to Wyoming's more typical pattern of back and forth
between court and legislature, the Vermont legislature did not require
the court's repeated push. In fact, the legislative response to the
Vermont Supreme Court's holding in Brigham v. State' T may have gone
further than the court's specific mandate would have required. Though
the school funding formula in Vermont currently allows more reliance on
local property wealth than its Wyoming counterpart, the bottom line is
that Vermont's version of full state funding has taken the important step
to correlate tax rate and tax revenues; all variations in local funding are
now the result of increased local tax effort, not increased local tax
wealth.
In its invalidation of the Vermont school finance statute, the
Brigham court adopted a fairly common mandate that the legislature
make education available on "substantially eq ual terms.' '88 Other state
court opinions that have used that standard'L9 have not produced the
substantial legislative overhaul seen in Vermont.'" In fact, the court's
opinion in Brigham explicitly accepted that "the state may delegate to
local towns and cities the authority to finance.., the schools within their
borders."''9 ' Its holding was limited to the basic determination that the
state school finance system, like that of many other states, produced an
unconstitutional level of inequality. It did not, however, require the full
187. 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
188. Id. at 398.
189. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 114 (Ala. 1993); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 194 n.4 (Ky. 1989) (quoting language of a school funding statute); Abbott
v. Burke, 71o A.2d 450, 478 (N.J. 1998); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 140
(Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989). A dissenting
judge in Rose pointed out the inconsistency of the majority's opinion. 790 S.W.2d at 220 (Vance, J.,
dissenting). Although the court had issued a mandate for a "substantially equal" education for all, at
the same time, it had left in place a local financing system that would continue to provide wealth-
based, and hence inherently unequal, educational opportunity. Id.; see also Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d
929 (Cal. 1976). The Serrano court has interpreted the standard of substantial equality as requiring a
range of no more than $ioo in per capita dollars for operating expenses for all school districts. Id. at
939; see also Hanif S.P. Hirji, Note, Inequalities in California's Public School System: the Undermining
of Serrano v. Priest and the Need for a Minimum Standards System of Education, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
583 (1999). As the plaintiffs argued in the recently settled school funding litigation in California,
however, equality of dollars may not produce equality of educational opportunity. See sources cited
supra notes 11-13.
i9o. In an earlier article I explained how state courts that relied on equality to invalidate school
finance statutes frequently failed to require equalization. See Reynolds, Uniformity, supra note 8, at
1851-56.
59t. Brigham, 692 A.2d at 395. The court's caution here was that the state "cannot, however,
abdicate the basic responsibility for education by passing it on to local governments, which are
themselves creations of the state." Id.
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state funding approach to which the legislature so quickly and decisively
turned.'92
As currently structured,'93 the Vermont school finance system is
based on a statewide property tax for schools.94 Its originality lies in its
categorization of all real property located in the state as either
homestead or nonresidential property.'95  Nonresidential property
crucially includes all second homes16 and is subject to a uniform and
fixed statewide school property tax.7 Residential property is also subject
to a uniform property tax' and comes with the district power equalizer"
guarantee that every district will receive identical per capita operating
funds from the state, irrespective of the actual revenues generated by the
tax in any particular district."
Local supplementation is permitted in Vermont, and a district that
wishes to spend more than the state-guaranteed amount must get voter
approval."' The increase can only apply to the district's homestead
192. One commentator has suggested that the rapidity and depth of the legislative overhaul of the
school funding statute were due both to the independent, longstanding debate over school funding
that predated the litigation, as well as to the fact that the Democratic Party controlled both legislative
branches and the governor's mansion. See Michael A. Rebell & Jeffrey Metzler, Rapid Response,
Radical Reform: The Story of School Finance Litigation in Vermont, 31 J. L. & EDUC. 167, 18o (2002).
193. For evaluation of Act 6o, the legislature's original response to Brigham, see Reynolds, Skybox
Schools, supra note 7, at 792-94.
194. Other funding sources include the state sales tax and proceeds from a new lottery. See id. at
795-96 n.2o7.
195. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5401(7), (to) (2007). Professor Kirk Stark made the same proposal in
his student law review note. See Kirk J. Stark, Note, Rethinking Statewide Taxation of Nonresidential
Property for Public Schools, 102 YALE L.J. 805, 806-07 (1992).
196. The properties most responsible for the extreme variations in school district wealth, local
property tax rates, and widely disparate school operating budgets were the ski and summer homes that
created Vermont's so-called "gold towns." See Town of Killington v. State, 776 A.2d 395, 396 (Vt.
2001).
197. The rate is currently set at $1.59 per $ioo of equalized assessed valuation. See VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 5402(a)(I).
198. The rate of $i.io is lower than the rate for nonresidential property but subject to increase
upon voter approval. Id. § 5402(a)(2). In addition, categorical grants are distributed across the state
for the costs associated with special education, transportation, small school size, state-placed students,
technical education, and early education. See VT. DEP'T OF EDUC., OVERVIEW OF VERMONT'S EDUCATION
FUNDING SYSTEM UNDER ACT 68 & ACT 130, at I (2005). Thus, the "equality" that Vermont seeks is not
a fixed per capita student equality, but rather a system that adjusts funding in accordance with the
special needs of each district's children.
199. A district power equalizer means that the state guarantees that identical taxpayer efforts will
generate identical school revenues, irrespective of the value of the property on which the tax is levied.
For wealthy districts, then, the levy is likely to require transfer of excess revenues to the state. In poor
districts, in contrast, state contributions will be needed to make up for the districts' low property value.
For an explanation of the district power equalizer, see Enrich, supra note to, at IIo-II, and Kirk
Vandersall, Post-Brown School Finance Reform, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUrrY 17, 22 n.i (Marilyn
Gittell ed., 1998).
2oo. This figure is currently set by law at $68oo per pupil, with additional funds allocated for
district and student special needs. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4011.
201. For a detailed description of the Vermont provisions, see Reynolds, Skybox Schools, supra
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property, and it is also subject to the district power equalizer."' Thus, a
district must increase its tax rate by the rate of revenue increase it seeks,
rather than by the tax rate that would produce the desired increase in
dollars if levied on the district's property. This new correlation of tax rate
with tax dollars generated removed an important pre-Bingham
advantage for wealthy communities, namely the ability to tax high
property wealth at a low rate to produce high revenues. Under the
current system, when a wealthy district decides to increase its tax rate, it
will have to relinquish to the state the percentage of the revenue actually
generated that falls above the desired percentage increase in its budget. "'
Conversely, a poor district's additional tax effort is guaranteed to
produce the same percentage increase in operating revenues, meaning
that state revenue will be added to increase the actual amount generated
by the district's property to the state-guaranteed amount."4
It is perhaps not surprising that the biggest strides toward full state
funding have occurred in states like Wyoming and Vermont. They are
states with few urban centers and small minority populations, both of
which have been the focal points of the most contentious debates over
school finance reform across the country. Moreover, the inequality of
property wealth in both states came from unusual sources-in Vermont
it was nonresidents' vacation homes that created the so-called "gold
towns,""0 5 and in Wyoming, the disparities came from the uneven
distribution of mineral wealth across the state.26 With the wealth so
clearly in the hands of nonresidents, the local control defense was harder
to make than it is when the image is one of taxpayers deciding to tax
their own property to raise revenues for their schools. Notwithstanding
the enormous political hurdles, though, the full state funding standard
offers promising alternatives to the recent decades of repeated litigation,
and it properly assigns the duty to provide education to the level of
government where the state constitution has explicitly placed it.
note 7, at 794-95.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Moreover, if a district's supplemental spending reaches a level of 125% of the state-
guaranteed amount, the town will be deemed an "excess spending municipality" and will be required
to make additional tax payments to the state. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5401(12). Notwithstanding
these equalizing provisions, it is not surprising that the Vermont statute continues to result in wide
ranges in budgets between wealthy and poor districts. Because increasing spending requires voter
approval to impose a higher tax rate, it is likely to be an option chosen less frequently by poorer
districts. And in fact, the gap in Vermont remains high. See infra note 220.
205. See supra note 196.
206. Campbell 1, 907 P.2d 1238, 1246 (Wyo. 1195).
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B. ADEQUACY, EQUITY, AND SUPPLEMENTAL LOCAL FUNDING
All five full state funding states have taken the important doctrinal
step of concluding that because the state constitution's education clause
explicitly imposes on the state the duty to provide education, it is the
state, and only the state, that must supply the funds to implement that
duty. The important corollary of that legal duty means that local
revenues cannot be used to finance any part of the state's obligation.
Where the states diverge, however, is in their attitude about the
permissibility of supplemental local funding, and this attitude is
determined by whether the doctrinal approach rests in adequacy or
equality.2"7 In adequacy states, the choice is clear: once the state has
fulfilled its duty, local revenue raising to supplement is perfectly
acceptable. In the equality states, in contrast, local supplementation is
either prohibited or extremely limited. Notwithstanding the small
sample, a comparison between the two suggests that if adequacy is the
doctrinal hook, the potentially far reaching reform offered by full state
funding is likely to become just another reshuffling of the deck chairs.
i. Full State Funding in Adequacy Jurisdictions
If adequacy is the doctrinal basis of a full state funding mandate,
legislative implementation requires the reconfiguration of education
finance to ensure that only state revenues are used to fund the cost of an
adequate education for all children in the state. Local supplementation
beyond that minimum is a foregone conclusion because once the state's
constitutional obligation is fulfilled, the state constitution has nothing left
to say about spending on schools, and state legislatures are free to
authorize their local districts to tax themselves as they see fit to provide
additional funds.2 In the legislative process that accomplishes the shift
to this brand of full state funding, wealthy districts are likely to fight to
keep the adequacy level as low as possible2" in order to minimize the
207. Although it is generally true that the differences between adequacy and equality are not
sharp, see supra note 9, in the full state funding context the two theories have put courts and their state
funding laws on very different paths.
2o8. The sentiment of the Kansas court is typical: "We fully acknowledge that once the legislature
has provided suitable funding for the state school system, there may be nothing in the constitution that
prevents the legislature from allowing school districts to raise additional funds for enhancements to
the constitutionally adequate education already provided." Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d. 923, 937 (Kan.
2005). The supreme courts of New Hampshire and Vermont agree. See Claremont I1, 703 A.2d 1353,
136o (N.H. 1997) ("Our decision does not prevent the legislature from authorizing local school
districts to dedicate additional resources to their schools or to develop educational programs beyond
those required for a constitutionally adequate public education."); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 397
(Vt. 1997) ("Equal opportunity does not necessarily... prohibit cities and towns from spending more
on education if they choose.").
209. For a discussion of the incentives that influence the course of funding in adequacy states, see
Ryan, supra note 9, at 1252-55. These incentives are not limited exclusively to the adequacy context.
In any funding system that preserves the local property tax as a school funding source, wealthy
districts will always push to preserve as much of their wealth as possible from redistribution by the
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statewide redistribution of wealth and to preserve local wealth for local
schools. This means, of course, that the preexisting benefits deriving
from the unequal intermunicipal distribution of property wealth will be
preserved to the greatest extent possible.
Of the three full state funding adequacy jurisdictions (Washington," '
Kansas,"' and New Hampshire), New Hampshire provides the most up to
date example of the shift in funding required to implement a full state
funding judicial mandate. Prior to the litigation in Claremont, state
funding accounted for only 8% of all state and local revenues." ' With
such a large percentage dependent on local property wealth, per capita
operating budgets ranged (and continue to range) from approximately
$800o per student to over $20,000 per student. '3 In response to its
supreme court's full state funding mandate in Claremont, the New
Hampshire legislature recently passed legislation that determines the
cost of an adequate education and provides that the state will be
responsible for funding the entire amount for all school districts in the
state. According to budget estimates, the plan will cost $971 million in
state funds, approximately $75 million more than the state now spends;
no decision has been made on where the funding will come from.
1 5
Although the full impact of the new state law cannot be determined
until the state chooses the revenue source, several points are worth
mentioning. First, it appears that the restructuring of the funding formula
will immediately produce a shift of state revenue from poor districts to
wealthy districts.1 Imposing a state duty to fund an adequate education
state because they rationally prefer to tax their own high wealth for their own use rather than have the
state tax it and redistribute.
21o. Litigation in Washington is ongoing. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
211. The court in Kansas terminated its involvement in the case notwithstanding statutory
provisions that did not conform to the court's standard of wealth neutrality. See supra text
accompanying notes 97-99.
212. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE EFFORTS TO EQUALIZE FUNDING
BETWEEN WEALTHY AND POOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS 14 (1998).
213. N.H. STATE DEPT. OF EDUC., COST PER PUPIL BY DISTRICT, 2006-2007, at s-4 (20o8), available at
http://www.ed.state.nh.us/education/data/ReportsandStatistics/FinancialReports/CostPerPupiUCostPer
Pupil2oo6-2oo7/CostPerPupil2oo6-2oo7.pdf.
214. The statute has a two year transition period and does not specify a state funding source for
the increased revenues, suggesting a rocky road ahead for the New Hampshire legislature and
governor. See Sarah Liebowitz, Lynch Lets School Plan Go into Law, CONCORD MONITOR, June io,
2008, available at http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/2oo8o6o/FRONT
PAGE/8o6oo3o6. According to the new state law, the cost of an adequate education is set at $3450
per child, with additional per capita grants of up to another $3450 per child, depending on the district's
total percentage of poor children. If 48% or more of students in a district qualify for free lunch, the
district will receive an additional per capita payment of $345o. At the low end, if less than 12% of the
population is low income, the district receives an additional $431 per pupil. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ I98:4o-a(I) (2oo9). Per student distributions are also given for non-English speakers ($675), id.
§ I98:40-a(II), and special education children ($856), id. §198:4o-a(III).
215. Liebowitz, supra note 214.
216. See Norma Love, N.H. School Funding Plan Becomes Law, TIMES ARGUS (Montpelier-Barre,
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on top of a funding system in which the state contributed a mere 8% of
the revenues inevitably means that the wealthy districts, which have up
until now been largely looking out for themselves, will benefit from the
largesse of state funds in the form of a fully funded per capita amount for
each child's adequate education."7
No matter how the New Hampshire legislature ultimately chooses to
fund its full state funding mandate, the state's share of total education
spending is sure to increase dramatically. What is equally clear, however,
is that although the new law may ensure that all districts in New
Hampshire are taxed at the same rate to generate the funds necessary for
the legislatively determined adequate amount, the tremendous gap
between wealthy and poor that triggered the Claremont litigation will not
be closed, and may not be much affected, by this law. 8 By leaving local
supplemental options in place, the funding system is poised to generate
the same intolerable inequality that was so essential to the creation of the
inadequacy originally.
2. Full State Funding in Equality Jurisdictions
In contrast to the likely trajectory of full state funding in adequacy
jurisdictions, Vermont and Wyoming's equality approach is more
expansive in its reach. In those states, the choice is between a system
based on taxpayer equality or one that strives for equal educational
opportunity. The former standard, reflected in Vermont's current school
funding law, ensures that the revenues generated by local tax efforts are
equalized across the state, with an equal tax rate generating equal funds,
irrespective of the actual property wealth of the school district."9
Wyoming has opted for the latter approach, requiring that all funding for
schools be based exclusively on the needs of the children and the cost of
the services and not reflect school district property wealth in any way.
According to the Education Trust's annual report on school finance,
the gap between rich and poor districts has actually grown by more than
$2000 per child in Vermont over the past few years."0 In fact, the gap is
Vt.), June 1O, 2o08, available at http://www.timesargus.com/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID'/2o08o6io/
NEWSo2/8o6Io033 4II003 /NEWSo.
217. Of course, the wealthy districts in New Hampshire will also contribute to the funding of the
adequate education, but the fact remains that the cost of an adequate education, which the wealthy
districts previously funded almost entirely on their own, will now be funded by the state as a whole,
thus resulting in a redistribution from the state to the wealthy districts. At the same time, that
redistribution means that the high property wealth in those districts now has a certain untapped taxing
potential that reflects the cost that has been shifted from the local to the state level.
218. Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1356-57 (N.H. 1997) (noting tax rate differential of 400%
between wealthy and poor districts).
219. Vermont's system applies a district power equalizer to all local supplementation beyond the
state guaranteed amount. See supra text accompanying notes 187-204.
220. According to that report:
In Vermont, the funding gap has grown by more than $2,ooo per student in recent years,
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similar to the disparity that formed the basis of the Brigham litigation.22'
The fundamental difference, however, is that although the tax dollars
may be unequal, the local tax rates are proportionate to those dollars,
and thus the overall tax system may appear more fair and less
controversial. In other words, those towns that have chosen to spend
high are also required to tax high, a fundamental shift from the pre-
Brigham situation. Thus, the Vermont legislation preserves some of the
wealth-based inequality of local control but democratizes it to the extent
that identical tax rates in different towns are guaranteed to generate
identical sums of money for schools.2
Going further than Vermont's standard of taxpayer equality, the
Wyoming full state funding approach embraces full vertical equity. All
education funding must come from the state, and all differences in
education spending must reflect actual cost differentials that the state can
prove. This approach is perhaps more radical than the others, but it is
also more clearly consistent with the foundational belief that our system
of public schools should provide an equal educational opportunity for
every child. Nevertheless, because some state constitutions may
constitutionally guarantee local supplementation of state funding,"3 and
because the political power of the districts capable of generating those
supplemental revenues is quite substantial, some recognition of local
power to supplement may be necessary.
3. Moving Forward with Full State Funding
As this small sample shows, even a full state funding standard may
not eliminate the disparities produced by local variations in property
wealth. The important lessons are twofold. First, if used in conjunction
with an adequacy standard, full state funding may actually redistribute
funds from poor to wealthy districts and further cement the state's
existing inequalities in school funding. It is only when full state funding
attaches to an equality norm, as it did in Wyoming and Vermont, that the
potential for systemic overhaul can be realized. As the example of
Washington indicates, leaving local wealth-based taxing and spending
even though the state was under court order to provide equitable funding to poor districts.
In 1999, Vermont ensured that high-poverty districts had $2,193 more per student. By 2005,
high-poverty districts in Vermont were receiving $264 less per student than low poverty
districts.
ARROYO, supra note 2, at 3.
221. See DARCY ROLLINS SAAS, NEW ENG. PUB. POLICY CTR.. DISCUSSION PAPER No. 07-1, SCHOOL
FINANCE IN VERMONT: BALANCING EQUAL EDUCATION AND FAIR TAX BURDENS 9 (2007), available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/neppc/dp/2oo7/neppcdpo7oi.pdf.
222. To the extent that poorer districts are less likely to adopt tax rate increases than others, of
course, the districts with greater tolerance for higher taxation, and hence, higher school revenues, are
likely to be the wealthier districts.
223. For instance, the Illinois Constitution states that "the State has the primary responsibility for
financing the system of public education," suggesting some constitutional protection of local funding.
ILL. CONST. art. X, § I.
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options in place means that the unconstitutional funding disparities are
poised to reemerge, suggesting a unending cycle of litigation followed by
legislative reform or, in the alternative, a judicial declaration that its
involvement will go no further.
Second, even in the unlikely absence of disputes over local
supplementation, the adequacy full state funding approach invites
repeated judicial involvement for other reasons. That is because it
requires a clearly separated two stream funding system, one state and
one local, with the former responsible for funding all components
determined to be part of an adequate education and the latter for all
additional optional expenditures. The potential pitfalls with this
approach are significant. For one thing, the definition of an adequate
education is indeterminate and constantly changing,224 depending on the
needs and demands of the population. Thus, adherence to the full state
funding mandate will require periodic reevaluation of what state funding
should cover. As a growing number of courts has recently withdrawn
from school funding battles, the adequacy approach, with its required
and ongoing judicial involvement, seems particularly inopportune.
Moreover, as local option spending increases, more and more of what it
funds is likely to be deemed part of an adequate education because, after
all one of the clearest indicators of what education should contain is the
evidence of what the top districts in the state are doing.25
In sum, for a court convinced that full state funding of education is
the only constitutionally permissible state of affairs, the experience to
date suggests that equality is a superior route to that end. Both the
adequacy and equality versions of full state funding take the important
first step to ensure that the constitutional duty is implemented at the
level of government at which the duty has been placed. As a result, both
approaches require a reevaluation of local control and a recognition that
in many ways the tradition of local control is inconsistent with that
explicit constitutional mandate. Nevertheless, the two differ radically in
terms of their potential to provide long term sustainability to the state's
school finance laws. In adequacy jurisdictions, the preservation of
optional local supplementation guarantees that education in the state will
continue to be available on the basis of property wealth, which will
ultimately neutralize the impact of the initial shift to a full state funding
approach. True, the shift will increase the state's overall contribution,
224. As Richard Briffault has noted, adequacy is "totally free-floating. It requires difficult and
deeply contestable determinations about the purposes of education, how to achieve it, and what
resources are necessary to do so. As opposed to equity, adequacy would appear to lack 'judicially
manageable standards' and therefore be a poor candidate for judicial enforcement." Briffault, supra
note 9, at 45; see also Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equity in Education: Deconstructing the Reigning
Myths and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 691
, 
705 (995).
225. See Campbell I, 9o7 P.2d 1238, 1274 (Wyo. 1995).
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require a clear separation of funding sources and a delineation of what
an adequate education costs, and demand proof that every district, rich
and poor, is receiving all of that money from the state. The important
base point of equality that it creates, however, is likely to be
overpowered by the anti-equalizing force of local supplementation, and
the experience of school funding in a number of states bears this
prediction OUt.22 6 Using equality as the basis of full state funding makes
the drift back to the unconstitutional funding system much less likely '27
and makes the allocation of money for education dependent on the
educational needs of the children whose constitutional right is at stake.
CONCLUSION
The proposal for full state funding of education according to
children's needs will undoubtedly find resistance on many fronts. Vested
self-interest, a sense of local entitlement to property tax revenues, and a
lack of political will to dismantle the existing statutory formulas are
perhaps the most salient obstacles. Nevertheless, for a number of
reasons, full state funding offers advantages for long lasting, systemic
reform.
The uniformity challenge described here has an important advantage
over existing doctrinal litigation strategies in that it respects increasing
judicial unwillingness to get involved in school finance policy debates.
Invalidation of the local property tax and a judicial mandate of full state
funding do not require a court to opine on the essential components of a
constitutional education or to establish how educational outputs will be
evaluated against court-imposed standards. Whatever subsequent
judicial involvement may be required will be limited to ensuring that
funding formulas are in fact wealth neutral and reflect only the cost of
providing educational services to different types of children.229
226. See supra text accompanying notes 21-61.
227. Jeffrey Metzler has argued that "adoption of a more progressive school finance formula will
not necessarily result in a more equitable allocation of education resources. To achieve this latter goal,
courts and reformers must dig deeper, and they must focus on changing the political dynamics that
perpetuate the inequitable equilibrium of school finance." Metzler, supra note 14, at 564. Severance of
the link between property district wealth and school revenues would certainly require a profound
change in the political dynamics of the state. Without such a paradigm shift, according to Metzler,
school funding reform will continue to drift back to the point of "inequitable equilibrium ... [that]
permits wealthy districts, even at lower tax rates, to spend more per student than poor districts." Id.
228. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 44-45; William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions
Posed by Rodriquez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the
Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. L. REV. 721, 721-32 (1992) (arguing that equalization is a
more manageable judicial norm than adequacy); Ryan, supra note 9, at 1255-59.
229. Although it would be foolish to discount the difficulty of the political process that would be
required to make that shift, the Wyoming experience shows that judicial insistence on real wealth
neutrality can produce a legislative funding formula that bases revenue allocation exclusively on cost
differentials. See supra text accompanying notes 176-83.
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Moreover, in terms of the legislative solution it will trigger, full state
funding is far more likely to produce the "enduring reform" 3' courts
hope to get from their legislatures. Because the local property tax forms
the base upon which most state funding is layered, its removal as a
possible source of revenue would require the state legislature to
dismantle the existing Byzantine maze of funding statutes and begin
anew. 3' This time, the legislative effort would be forced to identify
revenue sources and formulas for allocation that respond solely to its
state constitutional mandate to provide education. In turn, that new
focus would eliminate the current legislative dilemma of navigating the
minefields between, on the one hand, preserving privilege and existing
high levels of school spending in affluent communities and, on the other,
providing enough revenue to satisfy courts that the poorest districts have
not been totally abandoned. That means that the school funding debate
would focus solely on the establishment of wealth-neutral criteria for
allocation of money to all children in the state.
As a policy matter, full state funding would democratize the
"throwing money at schools"' 32 argument, an argument that has been
used primarily to reject calls for additional funding for poor districts. Just
like their financially disadvantaged counterparts, however, wealthy
school districts should also be called to account for the efficiency of their
spending decisions. The generally accepted claim that the socioeconomic
status of students' families and of their peers is the single most important
predictor of educational success 233 suggests that spending nearly $17,000
per student a year,'34 in a district with an median household income of
over $200,000 a year, 35 might not be an efficient use of tax dollars. 6 Full
230. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 445 (N.J. 1997).
231. The Texas Supreme Court's level of frustration with the lack of rationality of the state finance
scheme is not unusual, describing it as "complex and unwieldy," the result of "crisis management"
rather than deliberate policy. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Menu (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d
717, 726 (Tex. 1995).
232. See Reynolds, Skybox Schools, supra note 7, at 761 n. 23, 768-71.
233. This claim was first made in what has become known simply as the Coleman Report. See i
JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 312 (1966). One commentator
described the author of the report as casting "the longest shadow in modern American education."
PETER SCHRAG, FINAL TEST 205 (2003). For a description of the report and how it has influenced the
debate over the relationship between education spending and achievement, see id. at 205-30. One
recent study along the same lines concluded that the socioeconomic status of a student's peers predicts
more than three-fourths of the difference in academic achievement among students. See Russell W.
Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Resegregation Matter?: The Impact of Social Composition on
Academic Achievement in Southern High Schools, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SoUTm TURN
BACK? 127, 127 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005).
234. The State of Illinois reports that New Trier High School's annual operating expenditures
averaged $16,856 per student in 2007. Interactive Illinois Report Card, http://iirc.niu.edu/
School.aspxsource=Fiances&schoollD=i4oi62030I700o2&level=S (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (click
on "District Finances" tab).
235. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUB. No. SF3pI6o_395 I9, CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY FILE 3, It (2002).
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state funding would present that issue squarely and would pose the
accountability challenge to all districts in the state. In a time of increased
pressure on government fiscs and prevalent public hostility to taxes, full
state funding would engage the state in a long overdue statewide
discussion of how to best spend all of its education tax dollars, not just
those that are sent to poor districts.
In addition, full state funding would go a long way towards breaking
the sense of entitlement to local property wealth and the barrier it
presents to systemic reform. Disconnecting property wealth from
education funding without abolishing the local property tax can be done,
but it will require state recapture and redistribution. And, as the
experiences of Texas and Vermont have shown, contentious political
battles and strong popular opinion against the "Robin Hood" system or
the "shark pool" are inevitable.237 There is a tremendous difference
between, on the one hand, a state system that "recaptures" local
revenues and redistributes them across the state, and, on the other, a
statewide tax for schools.3s Moving the level of taxing and distribution of
school dollars to the state level would help change the popular attitude
about the ownership of local property wealth and its relevance to
schools. Making the taxing jurisdiction coterminous with the spending
jurisdiction is essential to the dissipation of the sense of ownership of
revenues that are, after all, being used to implement a state duty.
In a world in which the alarms about our children's academic
performance are sounded routinely,239 the full state funding of public
236. The New York Court of Appeals recognized, but did not condemn, this state of affairs when it
ordered the removal of the budgets of the top half (in terms of revenue) of New York school districts
from a computation of the constitutionally required per capita revenue amount. Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 54 (N.Y. 2006). The "cost filter" is required, the court noted,
because "not all schools operate in a manner that is economical." Id.
237. See Reynolds, Skybox Schools, supra note 7, at 788-97, 804-07.
238. See Schragger, supra note 123, at 1847. Professor Schragger wondered why taxpayers seem to
object more strenuously to state redistribution of local taxes than to the far greater levels of
redistribution that occurs with state and federal taxation schemes. Though that phenomenon is
described from many different doctrinal perspectives, the bottom line is the same: whether labeled as
the endowment effect, see, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003) (describing endowment effect as "the principle that people tend to value
goods more when they own them than when they do not"), the principle of reciprocity, see, e.g.,
Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative Research
Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 75, 122 (2003) (noting that if the level at which the government
collects the revenues is different from the level at which the government provides the benefit, a less
tangible sense of reciprocity contributes to citizen opposition), or the homevoter hypothesis, see
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HoMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLIcIES 120 (2001) (noting that citizens
view local taxes differently than taxes generated at higher levels of government because "Locals View
the Property Tax Base as Their Own"), the theories explain why we should not be surprised to find an
important link between the level of taxation power and the taxpayers' sense of ownership of those
revenues.
239. The negative comparisons between students in the U.S. and around the world are multiple.
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schools would confirm the growing recognition that the fate of a state's
economy and productivity depends on the education received by all
children. 4 So long as funds for schools depend on local property wealth,
the fate of the least advantaged and most vulnerable will continue to
depend on the magnanimity of the wealthy. The importance of public
education to our country's future, and state constitutions categorical
command that education is a state and not a local duty suggest that a
break with that mentality is essential to the sustainability of our public
schools and to our states' ability to comply with their constitutional
mandate.24'
To put it succinctly: "[O]n virtually every international assessment of academic proficiency, American
secondary school students' performance varies from mediocre to poor." See ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT
Eouc., FACT SHEET: How DOES THE UNITED STATES STACK UP? I (2008), available at
http://www.all4ed.org/files/IntlCompFactSheet.pdf. A report by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development and UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Literacy Skills for the World of
Tomorrow-Further Results from PISA 2000, compared international educational spending with
international educational performance and found that although the United States spends more per
student than any country except Norway and Luxembourg, its student achievement levels lag well
behind. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEv. & UNESCO, LITERACY SKILLS FOR THE WORLD OF
TOMORROW-FURTHER RESULTS FROM PISA 2000, at 111-14 (2003); see also IRWIN KIRSCH ET AL., EDUC.
TESTING SERVICE, AMERICA'S PERFECT STORM: THREE FORCES CHANGING OUR NATION'S FUTURE II (2007)
(claiming that the changing economy, the wide range of skill levels among the population, and
changing demographics as putting the country on a crash course for greater inequality and social
instability); Matthew Ladner & Matthew J. Brouillette, The Impact of Charter Schools and Public
School Choice on Public School Districts in Wayne County, Michigan, 45 How. L.J. 395, 401 (2002)
(describing international studies that confirm that other countries "spend much less and get much
better results").
240. The Supreme Court of New Jersey described how inadequate education has an
impact on the entire state and its economy-not only on its social and cultural fabric, but on
its material well-being, on its jobs, industry, and business. Economists and business leaders
say that our state's economic well-being is dependent on more skilled workers, technically
proficient workers, literate and well-educated citizens. And they point to the urban poor as
an integral part of our future economic strength .... So it is not just that their future
depends on the State, the state's future depends on them.
Abbott H, 575 A.2d 359, 412 (N.J. 199o). For commentary on the importance of broadening the base of
support of education beyond the self-interested parent group, see generally STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL
EQUITY 131-63 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., 1998) and Enrich, supra note so, at i IO-i I.
241. Opponents of equalization of school finance repeatedly make the "dumbing down" argument
that equalization would bring down the quality of education in the state's top schools. It is true that
the cost of funding all districts at the same level as the state's highest spending districts would be
enormous. In the case of Texas, for instance, the state's Attorney General estimated it would cost an
amount equal to four times the total state budget. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II),
804 S.W.2d 491, 495-96 (Tex. 1991). Similarly, a study prepared for litigation in Alabama found that
raising all per-pupil revenues to the level of the highest spending district would require an increase of
$i billion over the state's $2.4 billion education budget. SCHRAG, supra note 233, at 210. In another
article, I responded to the "dumbing down" objection. Reynolds, Skybox Schools, supra note 7, at
777-78. It is also worth noting that the phenomenon appears to have made inroads in public education
even in the absence of wealth neutral school finance, such that it would be a mistake to find a causal
relationship between the perceived dumbing down and full state funding. See Ryan, supra note 9, at
1247-50 (noting how the federal No Child Left Behind law creates incentives for states to reduce
expectations and standards).
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In terms of political incentives, full state funding would give all
districts an equal stake in the state's school funding statute and would.
give wealthy districts a greater incentive to work for high levels of state
spending on education. As Professor James Ryan has noted, "the best
way to ensure fair treatment of a minority group is to align that group
with the majority in such a way that the majority cannot help or hurt
itself without doing the same to the minority group. ' 42 Full state funding
is the only way to create that dynamic. With local property taxes
removed from the funding equation, all districts will have the same
incentive to seek higher state funding because no district can retreat to
its local property "pot of gold" to take care of itself.
Full state funding is still very much a minority judicial attitude
toward school finance statutes, yet its potential should not be
underestimated. For one thing, as the experiences of the last four
decades corroborate, alternative approaches have not produced
sustained reform. For another, the strength of the local control defense
of local powers to tax and spend is based on the image of a community of
families with children eager to tax themselves to spend money on their
schools. That image, however, is increasingly on the wane, fueled in no
small part by changing demographics, 43 and general antigovernment and
antitax sentiment.2" And as our communities become increasingly
stratified along socioeconomic lines, the standard account of unshakable
widespread public support of local control may be less accurate than the
common wisdom would suggest.45 In the final analysis, though, full state
funding's biggest advantages may be that it offers an objective, judicially
242. Ryan, supra note 5, at 271.
243. The percentage of household comprised of married couples with children has decreased by
almost half over the past few decades, dropping from 40% in 1970 to 24% in 2000, with the prediction
that the number will fall below 20% in 2010. CIYATA D. COLEMAN, DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY 2 (2o03), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/coleman.pdf.
244. See Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the 'Get What You Pay For' Model
of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 438-40 (2004) (analyzing government's shift from general
taxation to more particularized nontax revenue devices and how it reflects antigovernment and
antitaxation sentiments).
245. The work of Professor Myron Orfield has shown that all major metropolitan regions display a
remarkably similar distribution of population and wealth: 20% to 40% live in central cities; 25% to
30% in older declining suburbs; 10% to 15% in low tax base suburbs; and the remainder, the favored
quarter, in high tax base, wealthy suburbs. See MYRON ORFIELD, CHICAGO METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL
AGENDA FOR MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 27 (1998); MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS 2-8 (Rev. ed.
1997); Myron Orfield, Conflict or Consensus? Forty Years of Minnesota Metropolitan Politics,
BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1998, at 31, 34. If his analysis is correct, and the communities who benefit from
local control over local property tax revenues are in fact few in number, preservation of local revenue
raising may no longer be a political "sacred cow." See Frances C. Fowler, Converging Forces:
Understanding the Growth of State Authority over Education, in AM. EDuc. FIN. Ass'N, BALANCING
LOCAL CONTROL AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR K-12 EDUCATION 123, 123 (Neil D. Theobald & Betty
Malen eds., 2000).
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manageable and enforceable standard for the allocation of school
revenues and that it provides an alternative to the common wisdom that
wealth-based public education is a necessary fact of life in the United
States.246
246. According to a report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
wealth is more predictive of educational achievement in the United States than in any other developed
country in the world. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS FOR LIFE:
FIRST RESULTS FROM PISA 2ooo, at 286, app. B, tbl.6.2 (2oot). For evaluation of the forces that push
towards wealth inequality in school funding in the United States, see Enrich, supra note io, at 155-63.
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